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THE FUTURE OF POST-CONVICTION REVIEW 
 
  
David Wolitz∗  
 
 
Abstract: 
  
In the fall of 2006, North Carolina became the first state to establish an innocence 
commission – a state institution with the power to review and investigate individual post-
conviction claims of actual innocence.  And on February 17, 2010, after spending 
seventeen years in prison for a murder he did not commit, Greg Taylor became the first 
person exonerated through the innocence commission process.  This article argues that 
the innocence commission model pioneered by North Carolina has proven itself to be a 
major institutional improvement over conventional post-conviction review.  The article 
explains why existing court-based procedures are inadequate to address collateral claims 
of actual innocence and why innocence commissions, due to their independent 
investigatory powers, are better suited to reviewing such claims.  While critics on the 
Right claim that additional review mechanisms are unnecessary or too costly, and critics 
on the Left continue to push for a court-based right to innocence review, the commission 
model offers a compromise that fairly balances the values of both finality and accuracy in 
the criminal justice system.  At the same time, I argue, the North Carolina commission 
suffers from the tension –  inherent in all expert agencies – between efficiency and 
discretion, on the one hand, and procedural fairness and accountability, on the other.  I 
offer several suggestions for reform of commission procedures to help insure that none of 
these values is overwhelmed by the others.  Overall, the record of the North Carolina 
commission demonstrates that the commission approach can provide justice where the 
traditional court system has failed, and, with the reforms I suggest here, it ought to be a 
model for states across the country. 
                                                 
∗ Associate Professor, Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law Center.  J.D., Yale Law 
School.  A summer writing grant from Georgetown University Law Center supported the research and 
writing of this article.  I would like to thank Michael Seidman, Richard Rosen, Jeremy Pam, and Bella 
Wolitz for their support and encouragement.  I am especially grateful to Jeffrey Shulman for reading 
multiple drafts, providing helpful comments, and believing in the project from inception to completion.  
The article’s shortcomings are, of course, entirely my own.  
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“You want to hear that word – innocent – because that’s what you are.” 
Greg Taylor, the first person to be exonerated through the procedures of the  
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission.∗ 
 
Section I: Introduction 
 
The problem of innocence will not go away.  Since 1989, over two hundred and 
fifty Americans have been exonerated of serious crimes because subsequent evidence 
demonstrated their actual innocence.1  These exonerations, made possible largely because 
of new DNA technology, constitute the most dramatic story in American criminal law 
over the past two decades.  The problem of innocent people languishing in prison for 
crimes they did not commit is not, of course, a new one.  But the exonerations of the past 
twenty years have dramatically changed our perception of the scope of the problem.  If 
we ever could comfort ourselves with the thought that our elaborate criminal procedures 
made punishment of the innocent virtually impossible, we can no longer be so 
complacent.  Today, we know that hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent people have 
been convicted and imprisoned for crimes they did not commit.2  The sheer numbers of 
innocent people convicted is the major empirical aspect of our innocence problem. 
                                                 
∗ Greg Taylor, Television Interview with WRAL, Raleigh, N.C. (Feb. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.wral.com/news/local/video/7066396/ (last visited March 8, 2010).  Taylor served seventeen 
years in prison for a murder he did not commit.  Id. 
1 According to the Innocence Project, there have been 251 post-conviction exonerations due to DNA 
evidence alone.  The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration,  
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).  A 2005 study found a total 
of 340 post-conviction exonerations in the United States between the years 1989 and 2003.  Samuel R. 
Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 
(2005).  
2 The total rate of factually false convictions is a matter of considerable debate.  Compare D. Michael 
Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780 (2007) (finding that, in 3.3% to 5.0% of convictions in capital rape-murder trials 
in the United States between 1982 and 1989, the defendants were innocent) with Ronald J. Allen and Larry 
Laudan, Why Do We Convict as Many Innocent People as We Do? Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 65 (2008) (arguing that the rate of false convictions in Risinger’s study would be closer to 0.045% if 
plea bargains were included).  Even a 2% error rate in the conviction of those currently incarcerated in U.S. 
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The legal aspect of our innocence problem is the enduring resistance of our 
judicial system to recognizing post-conviction claims based on factual innocence.3  While 
there is a common perception that criminal convictions may be endlessly appealed and 
challenged collaterally, the reality is that after a valid conviction, there are very few ways 
for criminals to make fact-based challenges to the verdict.  The celebrated writ of habeas 
corpus – the most well-known avenue of post-conviction procedure – is simply not a 
vehicle for such fact-based challenges.  The United States Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to recognize “actual innocence” as a ground for habeas relief despite 
the pleas of numerous plaintiffs, activists, and academics.4  And while most state criminal 
procedure codes provide for motions for retrial, the statutes of limitations for such 
                                                                                                                                                 
prisons would mean that roughly 46,000 people are incarcerated in the United States for crimes they did not 
commit.  See N.C. Aizenman, New High in U.S. Prison Numbers: Growth Attributed to More Stringent 
Sentencing, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2008, at A1 (estimating the total prison population of the United States 
at 2.3 million).  The best estimates suggest that thousands of innocent people are convicted annually.  See 
also Richard A. Wise et al, How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 
CT. REV. 435, 440 (2009) (“Each year thousands of men and women in the United are wrongfully 
convicted of felonies that they did not commit.”). 
3 See infra Section II.  A word on terminology:  I use the terms “actually innocent” and “factually innocent” 
interchangeably to refer to defendants who did not commit the crime for which they were convicted.  See, 
e.g., Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the 
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346 n.92 (1997) (“Actual innocence means what it says – the 
defendant did not commit the crime of which he has been convicted.”).  I call convictions of the factually 
innocent “false convictions” and consider them a sub-set of the larger class of “wrongful convictions.”  
Wrongful convictions include all convictions based on legal error.  See Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down 
the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrongful Conviction Scholarship and 
Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1219 n.1  (2005)  (“I count myself among those who use the term 
‘wrongful conviction’ to refer not only to the conviction of the innocent but also to any conviction achieved 
in part through the violation of constitutional rights or through the use of systems and procedures that 
render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.”).  For the purposes of this article, I refer to any false 
conviction or wrongful conviction as a  “miscarriage of justice.” 
4 District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 , 2321 (2009) 
 (“Whether such a federal right exists is an open question. We have struggled with it over the years, in 
some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also noting the difficult questions such a right would 
pose and the high standard any claimant would have to meet.”); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554 - 55 
(2006) (“House urges the Court to answer the question left open in Herrera and hold not only that 
freestanding  innocence claims are possible but also that he has established one.  We decline to resolve this 
issue.”); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993) (“Few rulings would be more disruptive of our 
federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.”). 
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motions are usually very short and strictly enforced.5  Many courts, most famously the 
Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins, suggest that prisoners bringing claims of actual 
evidence should address their pleas to their state governors (or the President) who have 
the power of the pardon.6  But, of course, executive clemency is a matter of pure 
discretion, it is politically risky, and many state pardon boards are ill equipped to 
scrutinize such pleas, even if they are open to them.7 The most promising avenue for 
relief appeared to be the statutes passed in almost every state over the past decade-and-a-
half allowing for claims of innocence based on DNA technology.8  Unfortunately, these 
statutes place so many procedural limitations on the types of plaintiffs who can use them, 
the time within which such motions may be brought, and the scope of conviction covered 
that they have proven to be wholly inadequate to the task of providing a real mechanism 
for exonerating the innocent.9  The lack of any clear procedure for entertaining post-
conviction claims of actual innocence, coupled with the undeniable fact of wrongful 
convictions, is the Innocence Problem that will be the focus of this article. 
                                                 
5 See infra Section II. 
6 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415 (1993) (“Executive clemency has provided the ‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice 
system.”). 
7 Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 121, 145 – 46 (2005) (“For a number of reasons, clemency is simply institutionally incapable of 
providing meaningful and comprehensive review of bare-innocence claims. Throughout the country, the 
clemency process poses three major problems: (1) it is subject to the whims of the political process, (2) it 
lacks guaranteed procedural safeguards, and (3) its use is approaching the vanishing point.”); Margaret 
Colgate Love, Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate Sentencing System: Report of the Second 
Look Roundtable, 21 FED. SENT. R. 211 (2009) (“[P]roposals to ‘ramp up’ clemency in the federal system 
may be stymied by the resources this would require from prosecutors and courts.”). 
8 See Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything you Read: A Review of Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA 
Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 355 - 56 (2002)  (“There is no doubt that these statutes are 
revolutionary: they create a realistic hope for some of the ‘wrongfully convicted,’ erect brand new legal 
avenues for relief, and demand a new level of accuracy from the criminal justice system.’”). 
9 See id. at 356 - 67 (detailing the many procedural barriers to relief under the new DNA-specific statutes); 
Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocence Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-
DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 (2005) (detailing the many procedural barriers to 
post-conviction relief for petitioners who do not have DNA evidence). 
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For a variety of reasons, North Carolina was an early leader in the movement of 
states to respond to the dramatic rise in exonerations due to DNA technology.  A series of 
high-profile exonerations – including those of Ronald Cotton,10 Terrence Garner,11 and 
Daryl Hunt12 –  galvanized the legal community, and the Chief Justice of the State called 
a conference in October 2002 that led to the creation of a body called the North Carolina 
Actual Innocence Commission (the NCAIC).13  The NCAIC’s original mission was to 
study the issue of wrongful convictions and to make recommendations to “reduce or 
eliminate the possibility of the wrongful conviction of an innocent person.”14  The 
NCAIC’s first report summarized its research into the problem of erroneous eyewitness 
testimony and recommended a number of specific reforms to eyewitness identification 
procedures.15  Other states have also convened similar commissions to study systemic 
problems leading to wrongful convictions.16  A number of those commissions produced 
significant reports detailing the most salient causes of wrongful conviction, as well as 
suggestions for improvements to law enforcement and trial procedures.17  Only the 
NCAIC, however, recommended the creation of a standing state innocence commission – 
                                                 
10 See Wise et al, supra note 2, at 437 – 443 (discussing Ronald Cotton’s conviction and subsequent 
exoneration). 
11 Eli Paul Mazur, “I’m Innocent”: Addressing Freestanding Claims of Actual Innocence in State and 
Federal Court, 25 N.C. CENT. L. J. 197 (2003) (analyzing post-conviction remedies with particular 
reference to the failings of the courts in the case of Terrence Garner). 
12 THE TRIALS OF DARYL HUNT (Break Thru Films 2006) (documentary film detailing Daryl Hunt’s false 
conviction and eventual exoneration by DNA evidence). 
13 Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspective 
Joined by a Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647, 648 (2004).  Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr., was 
instrumental in the creation of North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission.  See Ken Smith, Innocence 
Commission is Lake’s Legacy, WRAL.com (Feb. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7084440/ (“Lake spent the early part of the decade championing the 
formation of the panel after several high-profile cases in which people convicted in North Carolina courts 
were shown to be innocent.”). 
14 Mumma, supra note 13, at 650. 
15 Id. at 653. 
16 See The Innocence Project, Innocence Commissions in the U.S., at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/415.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (describing commissions 
formed in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania).   
17 See id. 
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a dedicated entity with the power to factually review individual convictions and to refer 
worthy cases to further judicial review.  And despite considerable political obstacles, the 
state of North Carolina implemented the recommendation put forward by the NCAIC.18 
In 2006, the North Carolina legislature passed, and the governor signed into law, a 
bill establishing the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (the NCIIC).19  
Modeled after a British body called the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the NCIIC 
is an independent state agency with a statutory mandate  “to investigate and determine 
credible claims of factual innocence.”20  By design, it has the necessary investigatory and 
subpoena power to conduct factual investigations,21 and when the Commission finds that 
a prisoner’s claim of actual innocence is more probable than not, it forwards the case to a 
dedicated three-judge panel chosen by the Chief Justice of the state.22  Only the three-
judge panel has the authority to vacate the underlying conviction, and only if it finds that 
the petitioner has proven his claim of innocence “by clear and convincing evidence.”23  
On February 18, 2010, Greg Taylor, a North Carolina man serving a life sentence for the 
1991 murder of a 26-year-old woman, became the first person ever exonerated through 
the procedures of the NCIIC.24   
The goal of this article is to explain the commission approach to the innocence 
problem and to test it against criticisms both large and small.  I begin by explaining the 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Ruth Sheehan, He Fought to Fix Wrongs; Now He Waits, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb. 
10, 2010), available at http://www.newsobserver.com/news/counties/wake_county/story/330257.html? 
(noting that many prosecutors and victims’ advocates vigorously opposed the creation of the North 
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission) 
19 Jerome M. Maiatico, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry 
Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345, 1358 (2007) (noting that the bill creating the Commission passed the state 
House and state Senate in July 2006 and that the governor signed the bill  into law on Aug. 3, 2006). 
20 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1461 (2010).  
21 See § 15A-1467 – 68. 
22 See § 15A-1469(a). 
23 § 15A-1469(h). 
24 Mandy Locke, Historic Steps Lead Taylor to Freedom, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb. 18, 2010), 
available at http://www.newsobserver.com/news/counties/wake_county/story/344803.html?.   
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origins of the Innocence Problem in Section II and the history of the commission 
approach in Section III.   In Section IV, I canvas the major holistic criticisms of the 
commission approach from both the Right and the Left.   I argue that innocence 
commissions represent a sensible and pragmatic step forward in the classic debate 
between those who advocate for ever more generous collateral review and those who 
doubt the need for further post-conviction procedures at all.  The commission approach 
cuts through the procedural morass that makes substantive factual review in court 
virtually impossible for all but a lucky few, and it focuses attention where it should be – 
on the merits of petitioners’ claims of actual innocence – rather than on peripheral 
procedural issues.  On the other hand, the commission approach does not create any new 
Constitutional rights for petitioners, nor does it place any significant new burdens on the 
state judiciary.25  It thus strikes the right balance between the values of finality and the 
values of additional review and accuracy. 
In Section V, I lay out the case for the specific advantages of the Commission 
approach over court-based procedures.  I argue that innocence commissions share the 
merits of other single-focus agencies: namely, the development of subject-matter 
expertise, the power to conduct extensive fact-finding, and the mandate to identify, and 
recommend fixes for, systemic failures.  In Section VI, I discuss some of the 
disadvantages of the Commission approach – in particular, the great discretion afforded 
                                                 
25 The commission approach burdens the judiciary only in those rare cases where the Commission refers a 
case to a three-judge panel for the ultimate decision on exoneration.  So far, in just over three years of 
operation, the Commission has referred only two cases to a judicial panel.  See David Zucchino, North 
Carolina Man Exonerated After 17 Years, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/17/nation/la-na-innocence18-2010feb18 (“Taylor’s case was only the 
second to reach the three-judge panel, which is appointed by the chief justice of the state Supreme Court.”). 
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bureaucrats with very little accountability – and suggest several  reforms of the 
commission process to make it more procedurally fair and more accountable.   
By itself, the commission approach cannot solve the Innocence Problem, for the 
sources of wrongful conviction are too diverse, and not all errors can be caught after trial.  
But North Carolina’s approach has the potential to recast the debate about the Innocence 
Problem from one about Constitutional rights, the limits of habeas corpus, and judicial 
resources to a pragmatic discussion of how an expert agency can best deliver accurate, 
efficient, and accountable results.  The North Carolina commission, along with the 
process that brought it into existence, ought to serve as a model for other states as they 
wrestle with the difficulties of the Innocence Problem. 
Section II:  Traditional Notions of Finality and the Creation of the Innocence 
Problem  
 
This section will explain (a) why fact-based post-conviction review is anomalous 
within the Anglo-American criminal justice system and (b) why currently available post-
conviction review procedures – motions for retrial, habeas corpus, and the new wave of 
DNA-inspired innocence statutes – do not provide sufficient solutions to the Innocence 
Problem.  American criminal law has traditionally refused to recognize the legitimacy of 
post-conviction claims of innocence.  The reasons for this traditional aversion are deeply 
built into the Anglo-American criminal justice system and its adversarial structure. 
First, in the division of labor between the judge and the jury, fact-finding has 
traditionally been the province of the jury in our system.26  The role of the jury is so 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *379-80 (“[T]he principles and axioms of law… 
should be deposited in the breasts of the judges….  But in settling and adjusting a question of fact… a 
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sacrosanct that the Founders wrote it directly into the Constitution, giving criminal 
defendants the right to a jury trial.27  Judges – both at the trial level and on appeal – are 
thus understandably reluctant to usurp the jury’s role by second-guessing a factual 
finding.28  The judge-jury division of labor is built into the trial process from the 
beginning –judges often tell criminal juries explicitly that they are the fact-finders29 – and 
there is a correspondingly high standard of review necessary for a trial judge or appellate 
panel to reverse a jury’s fact-finding in a criminal case.30  Because of the jury’s role as 
the sole fact-finder, fact-based appeals practically do not compute in the traditional model 
of the Anglo-American trial.31  Indeed, the comparativist Mirjan Damaska finds the key 
distinction between common-law and civil-law criminal systems in the contrast between 
the common-law ideal of a flat, non-professional body of decision-makers and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
competent number of sensible and upright jurymen … will be found the best investigators of truth and the 
surest guardians of public justice.”). 
27 In fact, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases is set out in at least two places in the Constitution.  U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”); U.S. 
Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”). 
28 See, e.g., Lee v. Moore, 213 So. 2d 197, 198 (Ala. 1968) (arguing that a trial court’s power to grant 
motions for new trial “should be hesitantly exercised, because the verdict of a jury results from one of the 
most precious rights in our system of government, that is, the right of trial by jury.”); LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2000) (“Courts are naturally skeptical of claims that a defendant, fairly 
convicted, with proper representation by counsel, should now be given a second opportunity because of 
new information that has suddenly been acquires.”). 
29 Judicial Council Of California, Criminal Jury Instructions, California Model Jury Instructions §200, 
Duties of Judge and Jury (2009) (“You must decide what the facts are. It is up to all of you, and you alone 
to decide what happened, based only on the evidence that has been presented to you in this trial.”). 
30 In cases where the defendant appeals on the basis that there was “insufficient evidence” for the jury’s 
verdict, “the relevant question [on appeal] is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  See generally Chad M. Oldfather, 
Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437 (2005) 
(criticizing unduly high level of deference given to criminal jury’s findings of fact).  In most states and in 
the federal system, the trial court judge may order a “directed acquittal” before or after a jury verdict if he 
or she finds the evidence so insufficient that no rational juror could vote for conviction.  See LAFAVE ET AL, 
supra note 28, at 1128; FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), (b). 
31 John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 (2002) (“[O]ne feature that has 
remained constant amid the many variations that have taken place throughout the common law world is the 
jury’s relative lack of accountability to the legal system, the public and the parties in the case.”). 
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Continental ideal of a hierarchy of expert judicial decision-makers.32  The Anglo-
American system thus valorizes juries and devalues appeals, while the Continental 
system prizes professional expertise and enforces professionalism through frequent 
appeals to higher authority.33    
Second, the procedures of our jury trials are thought to insure against wrongful 
conviction.  A jury may only vote to convict if the prosecution has proved its case 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”34  This is the highest standard of proof in our legal system, 
and while there is much debate about its exact meaning, its signal to juries is clear: Vote 
to convict only if you are very sure that the accused committed the crime.35  On the 
conventional view, this rigorous standard of proof in criminal trials – as opposed to a 
lower standard, such as “clear and convincing” or “more probably than not” – reflects the 
high value our society places on convicting only the guilty.36  Indeed, on the standard 
account, the whole bevy of procedural protections for the accused at trial do the work of 
insuring that no innocent person is convicted.  These protections include, but are not 
limited to, the presumption of innocence,37 the right to confront one’s accuser,38 the rules 
                                                 
32 Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480  
(1975) (distinguishing between the Continental “hierarchical” model and the Anglo-American “coordinate” 
model of criminal justice and describing the jury as the “paradigmatic concept” of the Anglo-American 
model). 
33 See id.  
34 See, e.g., Jackson, 443 U.S. at 309 (“The Constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any person 
except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
35 The Supreme Court has shied away from defining the standard with any great precision.  See, e.g., Victor 
v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution does not require that any particular form of words 
be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.”).  But see Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 
39, 41 (1990) (finding Louisiana jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt standard unconstitutional).  
36 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) ( “The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal case is ‘bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.’”). 
37 See, e.g., Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (“At trial, the defendant is presumed innocent and may demand 
that the government prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.”). 
38 U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted 
with the witness against him.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a). 
 11
of evidence,39 the right to counsel and to silence,40 and the right to an unbiased jury.41  
These rules may serve a variety of purposes, but the primary justification for them all is 
fairness to the accused.  Critics on the Right routinely criticize these procedural 
protections for letting criminals off on technicalities.42  Critics on the Left sometimes 
argue that these protections are merely window-dressing in a system that convicts ninety 
per cent of defendants via plea bargain.43  But on either view, the grand procedural 
contraption that is the contemporary criminal trial is, in theory, a formidable bulwark 
against wrongful conviction.  
Third, the adversarial nature of the trial itself militates against fact-based 
challenges to conviction, for the adversarial model treats the trial as a game with two 
sides.  In this model, the prosecution and the defendant are the two players, the judge is 
the umpire, and the jury is ultimately the scorekeeper.44  The idea is that, so long as the 
rules of procedure noted above are scrupulously adhered to, then the outcome of the 
                                                 
39 Each state system, as well as the federal government, maintains its own rules of evidence for use in 
criminal trials.  The Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “These rules shall be construed to secure fairness 
in administration… to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 102. 
40 U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to… have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person… shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”). 
41 U.S. Const. amend. VI  (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”). 
42 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1018 (2004) 
(“About three-quarters of Americans think that too many defendants get off on ‘technicalities,’ a view 
reinforced by Hollywood dramas and celebrity trials.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994) (“In the popular mind, the [Fourth] Amendment has lost its 
luster and become associated with criminals getting off on crummy technicalities.”). 
43 Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 
YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 n.330 (2001) (stating that 91% of adjudicated felony defendants plead guilty before 
trial); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981) (criticizing 
the routinization of plea bargaining). 
44 See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (“Judges are like 
umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They 
make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the 
umpire.”). 
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game is valid.  The judge may punish breaches of the rules and outright cheating.45  But 
the judge, in this model, is no more interested in the outcome of the case than an umpire 
is interested in who wins a baseball game.  Instead, the game is meant to be won on the 
skill of the players (the lawyers) rather than on an absolute notion of a “right” answer.46  
On this adversarial model, the only legitimate challenge to a trial outcome is a charge that 
the rules were not honored, and thus that the game was not procedurally fair.  To claim 
that the outcome of a trial was wrong – to make an innocence-based challenge – 
presupposes a view that there is a right outcome to a trial.  But, on the adversarial model, 
to claim that a conviction was substantively wrong – wrong “as a matter of fact” –  makes 
about as much sense as claiming that the wrong team won a baseball game.  In the game-
model of the adversarial system, so long as all the rules were followed at trial, then there 
is no such thing as a wrong outcome. 
That these deep-seated features of our criminal justice system make innocence-
based claims difficult to recognize is borne out by the history of criminal appeals and 
post-conviction review.  Criminal appeals as such scarcely existed in the federal system 
prior to the 1880s,47 and while most states had a variety of mechanisms for reviewing 
criminal convictions, appeals did not figure prominently as a mechanism for protecting 
                                                 
45For example, the trial judge may declare a mistrial, or an appellate court  may reverse a conviction, on 
account of prosecutorial misconduct.  See, e.g., United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(reversing and remanding conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct); see generally PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT § 12, 14 (2009) (describing sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct). 
46 This adversarial model stands in contrast to the Continental model with its inquisitorial judge focused on 
truth-seeking.  See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A 
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 231-32 (“In contrast to continental Europe’s criminal 
procedure, our system has traditionally been more concerned with ‘procedural’ rather than with 
‘substantive’ truth. We are likely to accept the outcome of a criminal case as legitimate as long as it is 
reached in conformity with procedural rules.”). 
47 See David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal”: The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 521 (1990) (“For roughly the first hundred years of the federal courts, 
there was no right of review in criminal cases.”). 
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defendants’ rights.48  Today, by virtue of statute or state constitution, almost all American 
criminal defendants enjoy one direct appeal as of right after conviction.49  The main 
grounds for appeal are errors of law in the trial court – that is, assertions that the trial 
court misstated or misapplied the rules of  the game.  Although most jurisdictions today 
also recognize insufficiency of evidence as a ground for reversal on appeal, the standard 
of review for such a claim is so strict that such appeals are virtually impossible to win.50  
And because appellate courts have few mechanisms for independent fact-finding, 
appellate judges are generally reliant on the trial record for fact-based determinations.51  
After direct appeals are exhausted, the mechanisms for attacking a conviction are 
all extraordinary and extremely narrow.  The most famous of these mechanisms is, of 
course, the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus, which today is really a synonym for the whole 
system of constitutional, statutory, and common-law post-conviction review.  And while 
one might think that habeas would concern itself intensely with whether the prisoner is, 
in fact, guilty or innocent, a free-standing claim of innocence is not a ground for habeas 
relief.52  This is not the place to recount the entire history of habeas and its relation to 
innocence claims, but a quick sketch is due.  Habeas corpus, a process recognized in the 
                                                 
48 See id. at 543 – 48.  For an overview of the history of the availability of criminal appeals in state and 
federal courts in 18th and 19th century America, see id.  
49 See LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 28, at 1256 (“[E]very state and the federal government provides some 
means of appellate review…. In the federal system and in most states, statutes or state constitutional 
provisions guarantee defendants in all felony cases a right to appellate review.”).  But there is still no 
recognized federal Constitutional right to criminal appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) 
(“There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal.”); see also Rossman, supra note 47, at 519 (“As 
far as the Constitution is concerned, a state could eliminate everything but its trial courts.”). 
50 See Jackson, supra note 30 (articulating standard of review for insufficiency of evidence claims).  
51 For a discussion of the relative institutional competence of trial courts and appellate courts in fact-finding 
in criminal cases, see Oldfather, supra note 30, at 444- 49. 
52 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401 (“Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to 
provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.”). 
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Constitution and for all intents and purposes codified into federal law,53 provides a 
remedy for prisoners who can show that their detention is “in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”54  From the mid-1950s until the 
mid-1970s, the scope of habeas review and the grounds for habeas relief grew 
dramatically as the Warren Court constitutionalized more and more areas of criminal 
procedure.55  But as habeas expanded, critics began to argue that it was undermining the 
value of finality, vitiating the norm of federalism, and becoming too unwieldy, expensive, 
and time-consuming.56   
In this atmosphere, Judge Henry Friendly wrote an influential article arguing that 
only prisoners with a  “colorable claim of innocence” should be able to attack their 
convictions collaterally.57  And he directly challenged “the assumption that simply 
because a claim can be characterized as ‘constitutional,’ it should necessarily constitute a 
basis for collateral attack.”58  Judge Friendly’s arguments were rooted in his concern that 
the process of post-conviction review had become too cumbersome, with too many 
grounds for relief, and too much procedural rigmarole.  His call for a greater emphasis on 
                                                 
53 U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”).  The federal habeas statute is 
codified primarily between section 28 U.S.C. § 2241 - § 2255 (2006). 
54 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing relief to state prisoners convicted or sentenced “in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States”).  For federal prisoners, the analogous statute is 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(a) (providing relief to federal prisoner convicted or sentenced “in violation of the Constitution or laws 
of the United States”). 
55 See, e.g., Erwin Chemirinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 43, 55 (1989) (“[T]he Warren Court substantially expanded the availability of federal court habeas 
corpus review for prisoners who claimed to be held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.”). 
56 For the two most influential articles decrying the mid-century expansion of habeas, discussed in more 
detail below, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 
76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (focusing on the values of finality and federalism) and Henry J. Friendly, 
Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970) 
(focusing on the expense of collateral review and the irrelevance of actual innocence in federal habeas). 
57 See Friendly, supra note 56, at 142. 
58 Id. at 156. 
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actual innocence over procedural violations would, he thought, dramatically cut down on 
the number of habeas claims and, at the same time, focus attention on the most deserving 
petitioners.  His views were immensely influential in the academy and, to a certain extent, 
on the judiciary.59  In its rhetoric, the Burger Court (1969 to 1986)  “flirted incessantly” 
with the idea of making guilt-or-innocence the lodestar of habeas review.60  For instance, 
it refused to extend habeas relief to prisoners whose convictions rested on evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment – in part because such an extension of the 
exclusionary rule would deflect attention away from “the ultimate question of guilt or 
innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.”61  But, as Prof. 
Michael Seidman persuasively argued, despite it rhetoric, the Burger Court “in fact firmly 
committed itself to a process-oriented approach in which result played a decidedly 
secondary role.”62  And when the push to reform habeas finally reached critical mass in 
Congress, the resulting legislation did nothing to focus attention on the guilt-or-innocence 
of petitioners, but instead erected further procedural barriers to habeas review.63  In other 
words, both the expansion of habeas and its restriction had nothing to do with whether 
habeas effectively picked out innocent prisoners for relief; rather it had to do with shifts 
in consensus views about due process and federalism. 
To this day, the Supreme Court has never recognized a claim of factual innocence 
as an independent ground for a writ of habeas corpus.  The 1993 case of Herrera v. 
                                                 
59 See. e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity 
and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 456 (1980) (citing Judge Friendly’s article as 
“seminal”).  
60 Id. at 449. 
61 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976). 
62 Seidman , supra note 59, at 449. 
63 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) (enacting, inter alia, strict rules for 
successive habeas petitions).  
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Collins is still the Court’s most relevant opinion on point, and there the Court invoked the 
principle that “federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in 
violation of the Constitution – not to correct errors of fact.”64  Thus, “claims of actual 
innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for 
federal relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying 
state criminal proceeding.”65  The Court went on to suggest that executive clemency is 
the proper “fail safe” in our criminal justice system,66 and that clemency – rather than 
habeas – is the “historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial 
process has been exhausted.”67  To be sure,  the Court famously refused to completely 
close off the possibility that habeas relief might be warranted “in a capital case [upon] a 
truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial.”68  But in the 
sixteen years since Herrera, the Court has yet to find anyone who could meet the 
“hypothetical freestanding innocence claim” that it has scrupulously avoided recognizing 
or foreclosing.69  And in practice, that means that habeas litigants cannot bring a 
challenge based on actual innocence.   
Despite this history, the last twenty years have witnessed an extraordinary number 
of exonerations due to DNA technologies – many have called it the most dramatic 
development in criminal law in generations – and this development has not gone 
                                                 
64 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 415. 
67 Id. at 412. 
68 Id. at 417. 
69 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. at 555 (“We conclude here, much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a 
hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require, this petitioner has not satisfied it.”).  The Court 
has created an innocence gateway that allows some habeas petitioners to cure otherwise fatal procedural 
defaults if the petitioner can show that he or she is probably innocent.  See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 
(1995).  The innocence gateway created by Schlup only allows petitioners to overcome procedural default 
in order to pursue a claim of Constitutional error; it does not establish relief or a showing of innocence. 
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unnoticed by our courts or by state and federal legislators.  As the Supreme Court 
recently noted in Osborne, “[f]orty-six States have already enacted statutes dealing 
specifically with access to DNA evidence.”70  And the federal government passed the 
Innocence Protection Act of 2004.71  These statutes are all different from one another and 
difficult to summarize.  On the one hand, they represent a significant response to the 
phenomenon of DNA-based exonerations, and they do open the door a crack to post-
conviction innocence-based challenges.  On the other hand, these statutes so restrict the 
type of claims that can be brought, the classes of prisoners who can bring such claims, 
and the time-frame within which such challenges can be brought, that they fail to provide 
the orderly mechanism for post-conviction relief that they promise. 
First, almost all of these statutes restrict the availability of post-conviction 
innocence review to claims based on DNA testing.  Convicted persons who have viable 
innocence claims based on new evidence other than DNA are categorically excluded.72  
Second, the DNA testing necessary to mount an innocence claim under these statutes will 
itself be granted only if the petitioner meets a threshold showing of “materiality” – that is, 
a “reasonable probability… that the petitioner would not have been convicted if 
exculpatory results has been obtained through DNA testing.”73  This standard, already 
high, has been interpreted by many state courts to require “extraordinary circumstances” 
                                                 
70 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316. Almost all states also have a generic new trial motion, analogous to FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 33, available during or after direct appeals.  These new trial motions usually have strict and short 
statute of limitations – typically from sixty days to three years – and such motions must be filed in the court 
of original jurisdictions.  Daniel S. Medwed, supra note 9, at 676.  These motions have the benefit of 
recognizing new evidence as a reason to revisit the underlying verdict, but the statute of limitations makes 
such motions effectively unavailable for the vast majority of potential petitioners.  Additionally, it is the 
original trial judge who usually hears such motions, and the trial judge may be pre-disposed not to disturb a 
verdict yielded from her own courtroom.  Id. at 678.     
71  Innocence Protection Act of 2004, P.L. No. 108-405,§§411-12, 118 Stat. 2260, 2278-85 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
72 See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1679 (2008).   
73 See id. 
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and is often used as an excuse to deny DNA testing when there is a hypothetical chance 
that DNA evidence would not be dispositive.74  The Supreme Court itself recently ruled 
that there is no constitutional right to DNA evidence, so denials of access to DNA 
evidence are difficult to appeal.75  Furthermore, many innocence statutes categorically 
bar claims from convicted persons who pled guilty at trial.76  Given the prevalence of 
plea bargains, such a restriction effectively make over ninety per cent of convicted 
persons ineligible for innocence-based challenges.77  Additionally, many states limit the 
availability of their innocence statutes to a certain sub-class of serious crimes and to 
petitioners still in custody.78  In sum, the new DNA innocence statutes continue to throw 
up huge procedural barriers to whole classes of potentially meritorious challenges, and 
they fail to create a clear procedure for innocence-based post-conviction review. 
 
Section III:  Innocence Commissions and the North Carolina Approach 
 
Because of our system’s deep-seated aversion to innocence-based post-conviction 
review, some states are now looking at a more novel idea –  independent commissions 
dedicated to post-conviction factual review.  An innocence commission could come in 
many different varieties, but the essential idea is that of an independent commission with 
the power (a) to investigate the factual basis of existing convictions and (b) to refer 
worthy cases to a judicial panel with the power to vacate the conviction.  In this section, I 
                                                 
74 See id. at 1676-78 
75 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 – 23 (finding no procedural or substantive Due Process right to post-
conviction DNA evidence). 
76 See Garrett, supra note 72, at 1679 – 80. 
77 See Bibas, supra note 43, at 1150 n.330 (estimating a plea bargain rate of 91% for guilty verdicts). 
78 See Garrett, supra note 72, at 1679 – 80; see also id. at 1719 (chart describing limitations imposed by 
different state innocence statutes). 
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will summarize the history of the innocence commission idea and describe how the only 
functioning innocence commission in the United States – the NCIIC – operates. 
 
A. The British Criminal Cases Review Commission 
The first innocence commission of the type contemplated in this Article came into 
being in the United Kingdom.  Why the UK, a country with a similar legal system and 
with whom we share much legal history, came to adopt the commission approach earlier 
than any American jurisdiction is an interesting story.  After all, worries about false 
convictions, particularly in death penalty cases, have been a point of concern in the 
United States since at least the 1930s,79 while the issue became salient in the UK only in 
the 1980s around the height of the Irish Troubles.80  A significant difference between the 
two legal systems, however, is that appeals and post-conviction review were traditionally 
even less available in the UK than in US jurisdictions.81  Before the Criminal Justice Act 
of 1995, people convicted of crimes in the UK had one appeal available pursuant to the 
Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, and no collateral review procedures were available.82  The 
only mechanism for reviewing final convictions was a discretionary review by the Home 
Secretary, who had the authority to refer extraordinary cases to the Court of Appeal if he 
                                                 
79 See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932) 
(summarizing sixty-five cases of innocents convicted and suggesting legal reform to combat such 
miscarriages of justice). 
80 See, e.g., David Kyle, Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 657, 657 - 659 (2004) (detailing high-profile cases of wrongful convictions 
related to the Irish Troubles). 
81 In the UK, regular criminal appeals did not exist until the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, and even then, 
the appellate courts interpreted their mandate narrowly.  See Siobhan M. Keegan, The Criminal Cases 
Review Commission’s Effectiveness in Handling Cases from Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1776, 1787 – 88 (1999).   
82 THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 162 - 63 (1993) (Royal Commission Report); see 
also David Horan, The Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful Convictions, 
20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 91, 104-05 (discussing limited role of writ of habeas corpus in Britain).  
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determined that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.83  But the Home Secretary 
rarely invoked his power to refer cases.84  In the British system, the Home Secretary is 
responsible for law and order and the national police force.85  He or she has almost no 
incentive to appear “soft on crime” by prompting the reconsideration of final convictions.  
Ironically, then, the British adoption of the Commission approach can be traced to its 
very “backwardness” in the domain of post-conviction review prior to the 1990s.86 
A number of high-profile exonerations in the 1980s and 1990s raised concerns in 
the UK about the prevalence of wrongful convictions and the paucity of mechanisms to 
correct them.87   In particular, the case of the so-called Birmingham Six – six Irish men 
falsely convicted of bombing a pub in Birmingham – galvanized public opinion when 
their convictions were overturned in 1991.88  In response, the British Home Secretary 
created a blue-ribbon panel, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, and charged it 
with the task of examining the causes of wrongful convictions and recommending better 
procedures for dealing with such miscarriages of justice.89   
Under then-existing British law, the only post-conviction review mechanism 
available when substantial new evidence came to light was the authority of the Home 
                                                 
83 See Royal Commission Report, supra note 82, at 180. 
84 Id. at 181.  
85 Id. at 182 (“We have concluded that it is neither necessary nor desirable that the Home Secretary should 
be directly responsible for the consideration and investigation of alleged miscarriages of justice as well as 
being responsible for law and order and for the police.”). 
86 One might describe the UK’s adoption of the CCRC in the 1990s as an example of “legal leapfrogging,” 
whereby a country leapfrogs over intermediate stages of legal development directly to the most advanced 
processes and technology.  Cf. Jamais Cascio, Leapfrog 101, WORLDCHANGING (Dec. 15 2004), available 
at http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/001743.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). 
87 See Kyle, supra note 80, at 657 – 659 (noting high-profile cases of wrongful convictions, including the 
Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven, and the Bridgewater Four); see also J. David Hirschel and William 
Wakefield, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 151 (1995). 
88 See Royal Commission Report, supra note 82, at 1. 
89 Id. 
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Secretary to refer cases to a Court of Appeal.90  The Home Secretary could refer cases 
only if he or she determined that a miscarriage of justice may have taken place.91  The 
Royal Commission found that the Home Secretary was ill-suited to the task of post-
conviction review because of structural contradictions.  Because the Home Secretary was 
symbolically the chief law enforcement agent of the government, with ultimate 
responsibility for the national police and crime policy, he or she was inevitably reluctant 
to expose failings or problems in the police and prosecution services.92  In addition, the 
Royal Commission noted the constitutional incongruity of having the Home Secretary, a 
member of the Government, functioning in a judicial capacity, as the arbiter of legal 
relief.93  The Royal Commission found that the Home Secretary was aware of this 
anomaly in the separation of powers and felt reluctant to invoke his referral power for 
fear of unduly interfering in a coordinate branch of government.94  In fact, the Home 
Secretary had referred only thirty-six cases between the years 1981 and the end of 1988, 
an average of between four and five cases per year.95  Consequently, the Royal 
Commission found a real likelihood that miscarriages of justice might slip through the 
cracks, and it recommended taking the referral power away from the Home Secretary and 
placing it instead in a new independent Criminal Case Review Authority (or CCRA).96   
As envisioned by the Royal Commission, the CCRA would be “operationally 
independent” of both the Government and the Court of Appeal, but it would be required 
                                                 
90 Id. at 180. 
91 Id. at 181. 
92 Id. at 182; see also Horan, supra note 82, at 112 (“Understandably, acting as ‘both judge and jury in its 
own cause,’ the Home Office was not ‘very eager’ to expose the failings or misconduct of its own police or 
forensic scientists in obtaining wrongful convictions.”). 
93 See Royal Commission Report, supra note 82, at 182. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 181. 
96 Id. at 182. 
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to submit an annual report to the Government.97  The CCRA would have the capacity and 
authority to direct police investigations – or, in some instances, conduct investigations on 
its own –into the cases under review.98  Only cases in which normal appeals were 
exhausted would be accepted by the CCRA.99  The Royal Commission proposed that the 
CCRA have the authority to refer worthy cases to the Court of Appeal, though the CCRA 
itself would not have the fundamentally judicial power of acquittal.100  Upon such referral, 
the Court of Appeal would conduct an evidentiary hearing and take any action it deemed 
necessary, be it upholding the conviction, quashing it, or ordering a new trial.101 
Parliament adopted the recommendations of the Royal Commission in 1995 as 
part of the Criminal Justice Act,102 and two years later, a newly-formed Criminal Cases 
Review Commission (CCRC) began operations.103  Today, the CCRC is headed by 
eleven Commissioners, at least four of whom must be lawyers, appointed to five-year 
terms by the Queen upon recommendation of the Prime Minister.104  A group of roughly 
one hundred staff-members, including about fifty Case Managers, perform most of the 
day-to-day functions of the Commission, including in-take, case review, and directing 
investigations.105  Anybody convicted of a criminal offense in England, Wales, or 
Northern Ireland is eligible to apply for review,106 though applications are not accepted if 
                                                 
97 Id. at 183. 
98 Id. at 186. 
99 Id. at 184. 
100 Id. at 183- 84.  
101 Id.  
102 Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, 8 (Eng.). 
103 See Kyle, supra note 82, at 661 - 62. 
104 See Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform, or Both?, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 94 (2010). 
105 CCRC, About Us, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
106 There is a separate Scottish Commission for Scottish offenders.  See Scottish Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, available at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/home.aspx. 
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the applicant is still awaiting a decision on his or her appeal.107  Cases that meet the 
threshold eligibility criteria are categorized into one of four categories (A through D) 
based on the complexity of the issues, and the case is “allocated to a named caseworker 
who will carry out the review.”108   
The case review can take as little as a few weeks or longer than a year, depending 
on the complexity of the issues, and the case worker has the authority to direct the police 
to conduct specific investigations and to obtain documents from any public body.109  
When the caseworker has completed the case review, the case is referred to a 
Commissioner or a panel of Commissioners to decide whether or not sufficient grounds 
exist to refer the case to the Court of Appeal.110  The standard of review at this stage is 
“whether there is a real possibility that the conviction . . . would not be upheld.”111  A 
panel of at least three Commissioners must meet before any case may be referred to the 
Court of Appeal, though a single Commissioner may send out a provisional rejection.112  
If a panel of Commissioners decides that there is a “real possibility” that the conviction 
would not be upheld, it then issues a Statement of Reasons and formally refers the case to 
the Court of Appeal.113  At that point, the Commission’s involvement in the case is 
usually over.114   If, on the other hand, a Commissioner determines that a case does not 
meet the “real possibility” standard, then a provisional rejection notice, along with a 
                                                 
107 CCRC, How We Review Your Case, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/canwe/canwe_33.htm (last 
visited March 8, 2010). 
108 Id. 
109 See Roach, supra note 104, at 96. 
110 CCRC, How We Review Your Case, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/canwe/canwe_33.htm (last 
visited March 8, 2010). 
111 Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 13. 
112 See Roach, supra note 104, at 94. 
113 Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 13. 
114 Lisa Griffin, Correcting Injustice: Studying How the United States and the United Kingdom Review 
Claims of Innocence, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 107, 113 (2009).  The Commission does not represent applicants 
at the Court of Appeals. Id. 
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Statement of Reasons, will be sent to the applicant.115  The applicant then has twenty 
business days to respond to the provisional rejection with any supplemental information 
or arguments.  After reviewing any response from the applicant, the Commissioner/s will 
once again determine whether referral is appropriate.116  If so, the case will be referred to 
the Court of Appeals with a Statement of Reasons.  If not, then a final rejection and 
Statement of Reasons is issued to the applicant.117  There is no judicial appeal as such 
from a rejection, but applicants may challenge the rejection in court as they would any 
other administrative action by an agency for being “perverse or absurd.”118     
If a case is referred to the Court of Appeal, the Court has the benefit of the 
Statement of Reasons from the Commission.  But the Crown Prosecution Service has the 
right to defend the conviction if it so chooses, and the Court – sitting as a three-judge 
panel –has the ability to call a hearing and entertain evidence outside of the record.119  
After such a hearing, the Court of Appeal has the sole authority to quash a conviction, 
uphold it,  or take any other action it deems just.120  Such decisions are made by majority 
vote.    
The British CCRC has functioned for over a decade now, and while it has endured 
some domestic criticism,121 it has won over many early critics from both the Right and 
Left, and its future seems secure.122  As of January 31, 2010, the CCRC has taken in a 
                                                 
115 CCRC, How We Review Your Case, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/canwe/canwe_33.htm (last 
visited March 8, 2010). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Lisa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 1241, 1280 (2001). 
119 R. v. Craven, 2 Crim. App. R. 12, 196 (C.A. 2001) (holding that, upon referral from the CCRC, the 
Crown Prosecution Service may introduce new evidence). 
120 See Griffin, supra note 114, at 114. 
121 See Maiatico, supra note 19, at 1367. 
122 Id. 
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total of 12,376 applications.123   Of those, it has referred 445 cases to the Court of Appeal, 
which in turn has heard 411 of those cases.124  Of those 411 cases, the Court of Appeal 
has quashed 290, upheld 118, and has reserved judgment on three awaiting further 
hearing.125   In sum, the Court of Appeal has quashed convictions in close to three-
quarters of the cases it has received from the CCRC.  
B. Innocence Commissions in the United States 
During the years that the British were busy studying the problem of false 
conviction and creating the CCRC, the issue attracted scant attention in the United States.  
In part, this is because the 1970s and 1980s were a period of increasing crime and, not 
coincidentally, a period when “tough on crime” policies were popular with a broad swath 
of citizenry.126  And in part, American criminal defense lawyers and advocates held out 
hope that the existing system of post-conviction review – what I have called the habeas 
system – could be used to guard against wrongful convictions.  Three developments in 
the early 1990s changed the atmosphere in the United States.  First, crime rates began to 
dramatically decline, taking with them the power of “law and order” as a campaign 
issue.127  Second, the increasing sophistication and use of DNA evidence uncovered 
                                                 
123 CCRC, Case Statistics, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/cases/case_44.htm (last visited March 8, 
2010). 
124 Id. 
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126 See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 9, 10- 
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127 See Mauer, supra note 126, at 10 (“In 1998 the FBI announced that serious crime had declined by 3 
percent in 1997, continuing a six-year trend during which violent crime was down by 19 percent and 
overall crime by 17 percent.”).  
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numerous cases of unambiguously false convictions.128  And, third, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Herrera shattered whatever hope was left that the habeas system itself could 
be counted on to investigate fact-based miscarriages of justice.  
Of the three developments, the rise of DNA evidence has been by far the greatest 
factor prompting a new look at the efficacy of post-conviction procedures.129  It has 
galvanized groups in civil society, most prominently the Innocence Project, to advocate 
on behalf of individuals and for systemic reforms, and these efforts have borne some 
fruit.130  There is no jurisdiction in the country that has not been affected by the 
extraordinary power of DNA evidence, from new investigatory procedures, to new rules 
of evidence, to new criminal defense strategies.131  As discussed in Section II, since 1997, 
forty-six states and the federal government have passed statutes making DNA evidence 
available, within strict limits, to convicted people with colorable claims of innocence.132  
And, in some states, the momentum for reform has gone even further, resulting in the 
establishment of various commissions and working groups to study the causes of 
wrongful conviction and offer recommendations, along the lines of the Royal 
Commission in the UK.  
So far, at least six states – North Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Connecticut, and California – have convened some form of commission to study the 
                                                 
128 JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (2008) (“The renewed interest in wrongful convictions was catapulted 
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130 The Innocence Project, About Us, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 
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problem of post-conviction review.133  The factors motivating these commissions and 
their exact make-up and mission have differed from state to state, but they have all 
conducted extensive studies into the problem of wrongful convictions, and most of them 
have resulted in legislative reform and/or changes in law-enforcement procedures.  In 
Illinois, for instance, following a number of high-profile death-row exonerations, 
Governor George Ryan instituted a moratorium on executions and established the 
Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment.134  In 2003, the Illinois legislature 
passed legislation adopting some of the eighty-five recommendations of the Governor’s 
Commission, though many of the Commission’s recommendations remain unexecuted.135  
In Wisconsin in 2003, a Republican legislator and a former public defender together 
convened a panel – the so-called “Avery Task Force” – to study and recommend criminal 
justice reforms. 136  The bipartisan panel successfully ushered a bill through the 
Wisconsin legislature reflecting its recommendations for minimizing the number of 
wrongful convictions.137  The California Commission of the Fair Administration of 
Justice, by sheer dint of the size of the state, had perhaps the best opportunity to effect 
substantial change in the American criminal justice system, but its success is not yet 
                                                 
133 See supra, note 16. 
134 See Dirk Johnson, No Executions in Illinois Until System is Repaired, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2000), 
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REV. 605 (2004). 
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137 See Assemb. B. 648, 2004-2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005), available 
at http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/05-34921.pdf.; see generally Kruse, supra note 136. 
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clear.138  State commissions have usually focused on studying and offering 
recommendations related to the now-familiar list of the major causes of wrongful 
conviction: false confessions, eyewitness misidentification, false informant testimony, 
unproven or misused forensic technology, prosecutorial misconduct, and poor defense 
lawyering.139  There is reason to hope that the commissions’ recommendations, if adopted, 
will promote improvements throughout the criminal justice system – improvements both 
in limiting wrongful convictions and in finding the real criminal perpetrators.   
None of the commissions I have described so far resembles the British CCRC, for 
none of them had the mandate to investigate individual cases.  In fact, the original North 
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission (the NCAIC) resembled the other state 
commissions in that respect.  As in the UK and in other American jurisdictions, the 
impetus for the creation of the NCAIC was a string of dramatic DNA-based exonerations 
of wrongfully convicted individuals in the state prison system.140  The driving force 
behind the creation of North Carolina’s commission was the interest and energy of the 
Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court I. Beverly Lake Jr.141  Chief Justice Lake, 
known as “a conservative Republican,”142 invited representatives from law enforcement 
agencies, the criminal defense bar, and legal academia to a meeting in October 2002 to 
                                                 
138 So far, the only recommendations that have made it through the state legislature have been vetoed by 
Gov. Schwarzenegger.  See Radley Balko, Three Vetoes: Gov. Schwarzenegger nixes sensible criminal 
justice reforms, REASON MAGAZINE (Nov. 8, 2007), available at 
http://reason.com/archives/2007/11/08/three-vetoes  (last visited March 1, 2010).  
139 See Innocence Project, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, available at 
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140 See Maiatico, supra note 19, at 1345 – 46. 
141 Id. at 1356.  
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discuss the topic of wrongful convictions.143  The meeting ended with a commitment on 
the part of participants to establish a commission to study in depth the problems they had 
discussed.144  The Chief Justice took the initiative in setting up the Commission, applying 
for a grant of state funds from the Governor’s Crime Commission, and naming the 
members.145 
The NCAIC began operations in early 2003 with thirty-one members, 
representing all parts of the criminal justice system.146  Its overall mandate, similar to that 
of other state commissions, was “to make recommendations which reduce or eliminate 
the possibility of wrongful conviction of an innocent person.”147  Its Mission Statement 
called for the study of a wide range of topics, including “eyewitness identification 
procedures, DNA evidence/testing, false confessions, discovery and disclosure,... rules of 
professional conduct and their interplay with innocence, and the post conviction review 
of claims of actual innocence.”148  It was the NCAIC’s treatment of the final item on this 
list – post-conviction review of claims of actual innocence – that has set North Carolina’s 
criminal reform agenda apart from that of other states. 
It is significant that the Mission Statement of the NCAIC defined the problem of 
wrongful conviction with reference both to prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence and 
                                                 
143 See Mumma, supra note 13, at 648. 
144 Id. at 649. 
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prisoners exonerated without DNA evidence.149  Consequently, the search for reform in 
post-conviction procedure was not limited to DNA-related issues, as it has been in so 
many other states.  To the contrary, the NCAIC defined the problem broadly as wrongful 
conviction, and it quickly concluded that North Carolina lacked the necessary procedures 
and fora for reviewing fact-based claims of actual evidence.150  NCAIC members 
“familiarized themselves with the United Kingdom’s Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC).”151  And after much debate, the members voted 19-9 in favor of 
proposing an innocence commission modeled after the CCRC.152  Voting against it were 
the victim advocates and a few law-enforcement representatives.153 
 
C. The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission: How It Works 
The North Carolina legislature passed the bill setting up the North Carolina 
Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) in July 2006, the Governor signed it the 
following month,154 and the Commission began accepting innocence claims on 
November 1, 2006.155  While the legislature made a few changes to the NCAIC’s 
proposal, the bill set up a commission substantially along the lines proposed by the 
NCAIC.156  Specifically, the Act created a commission of eight members to be composed 
of one superior court judge, one prosecutor, one criminal defense attorney, one “victim 
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151 Id. at 653. 
152 See Maiatico, supra note 19, at 1357.  
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advocate,” one sheriff, one member of the general public, and two people to be appointed 
at the discretion of the Chief Justice.157  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the 
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals share the power to appoint the members pursuant to 
a formula described in the statute.158  The Commission chair is the one superior court 
judge, and each Commission member has equal voting weight.159  In addition, the 
Commission is empowered to hire – and has hired – an executive director and other staff 
to carry out day-to-day administrative, investigatory, record-keeping, and other tasks.160   
All claims addressed to the Commission must be from, or on behalf of, a living 
person who was convicted of a felony in a North Carolina state court and who claims that 
he or she is completely factually innocent of the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.161  The statute defines a “claim of factual innocence” as a claim “asserting the 
complete innocence of any criminal responsibility for the felony for which the person 
was convicted and for any other reduced level of criminal responsibility relating to the 
crime, and for which there is some credible, verifiable evidence of innocence that has not 
previously been presented at trial or considered at a hearing granted through 
postconviction relief.”162   
The threshold criteria implied by those definitions are as follows:   
(1) The Commission will not inquire into claims on behalf of deceased 
individuals; 
                                                 
157 See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1463(a). 
158 See § 15A-1463(a). 
159 See § 15A-1463(c). 
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 (2) Only convictions for felonies, and not for misdemeanors, are subject to 
commission review;  
(3) Only convictions handed down by the General Court of Justice of the State of 
North Carolina are subject to review; 
(4) Claims of constitutional, legal, or procedural defects in the process leading to 
conviction are not subject to Commission review; only claims of factual innocence will 
be entertained; 
(5) The petitioner must present “credible, verifiable evidence of innocence” that 
was not presented at trial or at a relevant post-conviction review hearing; and  
(6) Only claims of complete factual innocence will be reviewed, meaning that 
applicants must claim that they are innocent of the offense for which they were convicted 
and for any other criminal offenses related to the same crime.163   
In addition to the appointed Commissioners, the Commission is composed of an 
executive director and a staff of seven.164   The total budget for the Commission is 
roughly $375,000 per year, and the Commission has also received an additional federal 
grant of half a million dollars specifically for improving DNA testing.165 
The executive director and staff of the Commission utilize the six criteria noted 
above to screen applications that come in the door.  In addition, before the Commission 
staff will begin any review of the case, the convicted person must give consent for the 
review and fill out a questionnaire.  Many convicted persons fail to return the consent 
                                                 
163 See § 15A-1460(1).  For instance, a claim that one is responsible only for manslaughter, rather than 
homicide in the first degree, with respect to a killing is not considered a claim of factual innocence by the 
Commission. 
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form and the initial questionnaire.166  Before launching a “formal inquiry,” the 
Commission staff gathers relevant legal documents and background about the case, and 
may even do some preliminary factual investigation, to determine whether the application 
meets the criteria.167  The vast majority of claims are rejected before a formal inquiry 
begins because the application fails to meet one criteria or the other.168  In such cases, the 
claim is rejected, and no further action is taken.   A rejected applicant has no right to 
appeal a rejection from the Commission in any court or in any other forum.169  As of 
March 2010, out of a total of 635 applications, only twelve (less than two per cent of all 
claims) had met the criteria for “formal inquiry.”170 
Moreover, the Commission will not begin a formal inquiry into a case unless and 
until “the convicted person waives his or her procedural safeguards and privileges, agrees 
to cooperate with the Commission, and agrees to provide full disclosure regarding all 
inquiry requirements of the Commission.”171  The rights and safeguards that an applicant 
must give up include “the right against self-incrimination, attorney-client privilege, 
spousal privilege, patient-physician privilege, priest-penitent privilege, and other types of 
privileged communication.”172  And the statute adds that “[i]f, at any point during an 
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inquiry, the convicted person refuses to comply with requests of the Commission or is 
otherwise deemed to be uncooperative by the Commission, the Commission shall 
discontinue the inquiry.”173  In short, an applicant must waive rights that are taken for 
granted in the adversarial process, must pledge complete cooperation with the 
Commission, and must maintain such cooperation throughout the inquiry.  Only then – 
and only if the applicant meets all of the other criteria noted above – will the Commission 
launch a formal inquiry.  
Once the Commission begins a formal inquiry, it has the power to “issue process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, administer oaths,.. 
and prescribe its own rules of procedure.”174  In addition, it can obtain information 
through any of the procedures available in the Criminal Procedures Act or the Rules of 
Civil Procedure.175  A formal inquiry is not an adversarial proceeding.  To the contrary, it 
is a Commission-driven fact-finding inquiry that has more in common with the 
“inquisitorial approach” of Continental civil-law systems than the adversarial approach of 
the traditional Anglo-American trial.  The Commission staff drives the process, searching 
for and compelling disclosure of information as it sees fit.176  There is no role for the 
prosecutor or for an applicant’s counsel in the formal inquiry process; they are on the 
sidelines.  And in sharp contrast to the public nature of a criminal trial, none of the 
records or proceedings of the Commission are subject to the public record and public 
meeting laws.177   Indeed, all such records and proceedings are confidential, with the sole 
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exception that if the Commission votes to refer the case to a special three-judge panel, 
then all supporting records, files, and transcripts of hearings will become public.178 
When a formal inquiry comes to an end, the Commissioners hold hearings – 
public or private, at their discretion – to determine whether “there is sufficient evidence 
of factual innocence to merit judicial review.”179  At the end of the hearing, all eight 
Commissioners vote, and in order for the case to clear the commission and go on to 
judicial review, five or more Commissioners must vote in favor of referral.180  If the 
convicted person had pled guilty at trial, however, then all eight commissioners must 
unanimously vote in favor of referral.181  If the case does not pass the necessary five-
person majority (or unanimity in the case of a guilty plea), then the Commission “shall 
document that opinion, along with supporting findings of fact” and send those documents 
to the trial court and the district attorney’s office in the district of original jurisdiction.182  
At that point, the case is closed. 
If, however, the case does clear the five-person majority (or unanimity in the case 
of a guilty plea), then the commission will refer the case to the Chief Justice, who will in 
turn appoint a special three-judge panel to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the 
matter.183  Back in front of the three-judge panel for an evidentiary hearing, the process 
becomes recognizably adversarial again, with state prosecutors representing the State and 
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the applicant’s attorney arguing his client’s innocence.184  The standard of review in front 
of the judicial panel is “whether the convicted person has proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that [he or she] is innocent of the charges.”185  The conviction will be vacated 
only if all three judges on the panel find that the applicant has met the “clear and 
convincing” standard of actual innocence.186  Anything less than a unanimous panel 
results in a denial of relief, and there is no appeal from the three-judge panel’s verdict.187  
To date, only three cases have made it though formal inquiry to a vote in front of 
the eight-member Commission, and the Commission has voted only two cases through to 
the three-judge panel.188  The three-judge panel denied relief to the first petitioner whose 
case the Commission referred.189  The petitioner in that case challenged his conviction for 
molesting his six-year-old daughter.  Since the trial, the daughter had recanted her 
original testimony, and she and her siblings testified that their grandmother had coached 
her into testifying against her father at trial.190  The three-judge panel in that case found 
that the applicant did not meet the “clear and convincing” standard of proof. 
The second case to reach the three-judge panel was a high-profile murder case.  In 
1993, Greg Taylor was convicted of murder in the beating death of Jacquetta Thomas in 
Raleigh, North Carolina.191  The body of the murder victim was found near a truck that 
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belonged to Taylor, and he was convicted primarily on evidence that blood from the 
victim’s body was found in his truck and testimony from a jailhouse informant.192  Taylor 
maintained his innocence throughout the trial and in numerous post-conviction hearings, 
but he had exhausted all his appeals and collateral review options by 2004.193  He filed a 
claim with the Commission, and after formal inquiry, the Commission voted 
unanimously to refer his case to the three-judge panel – in large part on the strength of 
new evidence showing that the victim’s blood was not, in fact, on his truck and that 
contemporaneous blood lab reports to that effect had been covered up at trial.194  After six 
dramatic days of testimony in front of the judicial panel in February 2010, the court 
found that Taylor had demonstrated “clear and convincing” evidence of actual innocence, 
dismissed his conviction, and set him free.195  The exoneration of Greg Taylor has raised 
the profile of the Commission and ignited new interest in its procedures.196 
 
Section IV:  Holistic Criticisms 
 
 
The NCIIC is the first commission of its kind in the United States, and almost 
everything about it – from its inception to its composition to its procedures – can be fairly 
debated.  In this section, I will present and assess the most powerful holistic criticisms of 
the North Carolina Commission, the criticisms that bear most directly on the question:  
Does the commission model represent a real improvement over the status quo?  Not all of 
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these criticisms fit into a tidy model, but for organizational purposes, I will group the 
criticisms into two broad categories: first those from the Right and then those from the 
Left.  I use those terms here in the colloquial way they are often invoked in discussions of 
criminal justice, the “Right” representing a more conservative, law-and-order, pro-
prosecution perspective,197 and the “Left” representing a reform-minded, fairness-focused, 
pro-defense perspective.198  
The fundamental clash of values animating most discussions of post-conviction 
review is the clash between the norm of finality, on the one hand, and the values of 
additional review on the other.199  The Court often speaks explicitly about “balancing” 
the interests served by finality against the interests asserted by litigants in additional 
review.200  Predictably, the more liberal members of the court tend to come down on the 
side of further review, and the more conservative members tend to come down on the 
side of enforcing finality.  The battle in each case is over how much damage additional 
review would inflict on finality and whether that damage is worth the benefits of review.  
In this section, I will begin by summarizing the general arguments in favor of finality 
before detailing and assessing the main Right-wing criticisms of the Commission 
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approach.  Then, I will summarize the general arguments in favor of additional review 
before detailing and assessing the Left’s major criticism of the Commission approach.201   
A.  Criticism from the Right: Taking Finality Seriously 
Simply put, many on the Right will argue that the innocence commission 
approach goes too far on the side of unfettered review and does too much damage to the 
interests served by finality in criminal law.  By most accounts, those interests – which I 
will discuss in more detail below – include most prominently (a) judicial economy, (b) 
the aims of punishment, (c) general repose, and (d) incentivizing robust trials.   
Judicial economy – or “conservation of resources” as Prof. Paul Bator called it – 
is, for many, the primary justification for finality.202  The basic idea is that our criminal 
justice system – indeed, any human system – has limited resources with which to fulfill 
its tasks and that all efforts should be made to wring unnecessary procedures out of the 
system.  “If a job can be well done once, it should not be done twice…. Why duplicate 
effort?” Prof. Bator asked.203  Any incremental increase in review adds to already 
overwhelmed courts’ dockets, increases expenses, and takes away resources from 
adjudication of newer and more pressing matters.204  Without some very compelling 
reasons, the argument goes, there should be a presumption against dedicating more 
resources to disputes already authoritatively decided by the criminal justice system.   
                                                 
201 My own view is that the clash between the norms animating finality and those that counsel in favor of 
increased review cannot be determined in any neutral, logical way. The values at stake on each side are 
legitimate, though they are largely incommensurable; there is no single meta-value by which we can judge 
when we need marginally more finality or marginally more review.  I do not, therefore, propose to locate, 
through an exercise in logic, exactly where we ought to draw the line on the finality-review spectrum.  But 
it is important to understand the equities on both sides of the issue to understand the costs and benefits of 
the innocence commission approach and to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of arguments on 
both sides.    
202 See Bator, supra note 56, at 451. 
203 Id. 
204 See Friendly, supra note 56, at 148 (“The most serious single evil with today’s proliferation of collateral 
attack is its drain upon the resources of the community – judges, prosecutors, and attorneys appointed to aid  
the accused, and even of that oft-overlooked necessity, courtrooms.”). 
 40
Second, many argue that finality is a necessary pre-condition for achieving the 
ends of punishment, no matter what one believes those ultimate ends to be.  “Surely it is 
essential to the educational and deterrent functions of the criminal law that we be able to 
say that one violating that law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, 
just punishment,” wrote Prof. Bator.205  There must be some point at which a conviction 
becomes irreversible and punishment inevitable if punishment is to effectively act as any 
sort of deterrent or if any retribution is to be had.  Moreover, an “endless reopening of 
convictions, with its continuing underlying implication that perhaps the defendant can 
escape from corrective sanctions after all” is inconsistent with the rehabilitative goals of 
punishment, which requires the “realization by the convict that he is justly subject to 
reeducation and treatment in the first place.”206  The idea here is that all adjudication of 
the dispute must end – that is, conviction must be final – before the aims of punishment 
can begin to have any effect. 
Related to the idea of finality-as-precondition-for-punishment is the idea of 
finality-as-repose.  Repose is a difficult concept to pin down, as even those who 
emphasize it admit.  Judge Friendly described it as the “human desire that things must 
sometime come to an end.”207  Prof. Bator spoke of repose as a “psychological necessity” 
and contrasted it with “perpetual and unreasoned anxiety.”208  A legal system is not 
fulfilling its social function if it fails at some point to put to rest the bulk of legal disputes, 
for the society has a profound need to move on from such disputes. Both Judge Friendly 
and Prof. Bator took pains to emphasize that repose is not just a fancy way to describe 
                                                 
205 See Bator, supra note 56, at 452. 
206 Id. 
207 See Friendly, supra note 56, at 149. 
208 See Bator, supra note 56, at 453. 
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“mere complacency.”209 Rather, for both of them, repose is a state of reasonable 
psychological security (or closure) that allows a society and its members to “leave[] well 
enough alone” and “channel[] our limited resources of concern toward more productive 
ends.”210  While there is some overlap here with the idea of judicial economy, the 
emphasis of finality-as-repose is not on conserving the physical or monetary resources of 
a society, but rather its psychological or spiritual energy.  On this account, repose is a 
society’s basic conviction that it has resolved past disputes and can now take on new 
tasks.211 
Finally, some argue that a commitment to finality is part and parcel of a 
commitment to the criminal trial of first instance.  First, there is the worry that trial 
judges – and we might add, trial juries – might not put a sufficient amount of effort into 
the matters before them if they think that they are engaged in mere “suggestion-making” 
rather than authoritative decision-making.212  Prof. Bator “could imagine nothing more 
subversive of a judge’s sense of responsibility” than “the notion that all the shots will 
                                                 
209 Id.; Friendly, supra note 56, at 149.  Implicitly, the difference between repose and complacency is that 
the latter indicates a general lack of concern about whether justice is being done.   Repose is a state in 
which one is fairly confident that justice has been done.  Why the confidence that there are so few innocent 
people being convicted?  Because, on this account, the system is designed to err on the side of innocence.  
As Prof. Hazard put it, “The presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to 
counsel, and all the rest of the legal protections given an accused are means to lead the system into 
regularly making Type II errors.”  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Preclusion in a Federal System: Reflections on  
the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 651 (1985). 
210 Bator, supra note 56, at 453. 
211 The value of repose is most clear when one thinks of a crime victim and/or his or her loved ones.  It 
must be terribly upsetting to see the person that the court system has already found guilty of the crime re-
open the case years after trial and appeal.  From the perspective of the convicted person (even a falsely 
convicted person), there may also be some psychological benefit to knowing that the “fight” over the 
conviction has, or will, come to an end.  For it is only after that end-point has been reached that the 
convicted person can turn his full attention to other concerns in life.  Finally, there is broad agreement that 
for many criminal cases, the sheer passage of time makes accurate determinations of guilt or innocence 
more difficult.  Finality acts as a general bar against re-litigation of an issue long after memories have faded, 
evidence has gone stale, and files have been lost.  It gives prosecutors the assurance that there is a point 
after which they no longer have to keep proving the legitimacy of the conviction.  In this sense, finality-as-
repose serves a similar function to routine statutes of limitation – it lets the legal status quo be so that 
everybody in the system can go on to the next issue.   
212 Hazard, supra note 209, at 650. 
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always be called by someone else.”213  The idea here is that the system needs to invest 
some decision-maker(s) – namely, the trial judge and jury – with sufficient final authority 
to impress upon them the weight of their responsibility.  Any increase in the ability of the 
litigants to re-open the case post-trial necessarily diminishes the trial court’s authority 
and thus undermines its sense of responsibility.  At the same time, there is a worry  that 
the litigants themselves will invest less time and energy into the trial process to the extent 
that final decisions are, in fact, made at some later point in the process.  “The prospect of 
relitigation,” Judge Easterbrook has written, “would reduce the effective stakes of the 
first case, leading to an erosion in accuracy.”214  Because the trial is precisely the 
procedure in our system best suited for thrashing out the issues at stake in litigation, 
especially issues of fact, parties to the criminal case should “concentrate their energies 
and resources on getting things right the first time.”215  The availability of post-conviction 
review, on this account, saps the urgency out of trials, and thus does real damage to the 
most important and most comprehensive forum of decision-making in the whole system. 
I have laid out these conventional accounts of finality to show that a general 
presumption against revision – that is, against more post-conviction review – is supported 
by a constellation of important social interests.  There are real costs, both tangible and 
intangible, to re-opening final convictions to review, and “second-guessing merely for the 
sake of second-guessing” is not a sufficient reason to create collateral procedures.216  Of 
course, a single focus on the norm of finality is not tenable, for the criminal justice 
                                                 
213 Bator, supra note 56, at 451.  Geoffrey Hazard asked, “what if everything a trial judge does is in 
principle merely provisional, subject to approval by higher authority, both as to substance and as to 
technical regularity?  In that model of system the first instance functionary epitomizes the low level 
bureaucrat…. they are not treated as judges.” Hazard, supra note 209, at 650. 
214 United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 201 (7th Cir. 1988).  
215 Id. 
216 Bator, supra note 56, at 451. 
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system must also endeavor to meet other ends – among them, accuracy, fairness, and 
fidelity to Constitutional norms.  But for critics on the Right, the commission approach to 
collateral review runs roughshod over traditional notions of finality, and thus represents 
an anomaly in our criminal justice system.  In the next four sub-sections, I will sketch the 
major versions of the finality-based criticism of the commission approach and assess the 
strength of the claims.  
 1.  All Post-Conviction Factual Review Is Categorically Unnecessary 
The unstated premise at the root of the commission approach is that there ought to 
be some post-conviction mechanism available for reviewing a freestanding claim of 
actual innocence.  An attack on this premise is the most fundamental criticism that can be 
brought against the commission approach, and dealing with this criticism entails entering 
into some of the most profound debates about the nature of post-conviction review.  What 
are the purposes of post-conviction review, and what procedures (if any) best fulfill those 
purposes? 
Paul Bator’s 1963 article Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus 
for State Prisoners is a good place to enter the debate, for although the bulk of his article 
is devoted to the thorny issue of federalism,217 his discussion of the concept of finality 
has been a hugely influential articulation of the conservative position on post-conviction 
review.218  He began his analysis with the observation that “the possibility of error” is 
                                                 
217 See Bator, supra note 56, at 463 – 83. For understandable reasons, the issue of federalism has dominated 
discussions of post-conviction review in  the United States.  The commission approach, however, does not 
directly implicate issues of federalism, for commissions are creatures of the same sovereign as the 
convicting authority (the state) – as opposed to federal courts sitting in judgment of state-level convictions.  
One can imagine, however, future cases in which the actions of a state innocence commission may 
themselves be at issue in federal habeas cases.  
218 Supreme Court opinions have cited Prof. Bator’s article over twenty times.  See, e.g., Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 272 n.6 (2008); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n. 35 (1976).  Prof. Bator, it 
bears remembering, wrote Finality in Criminal Law in the early 1950s, a time when the scope of federal 
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“inherent in any process.”219  Consequently, “if the existence vel non of a mistake 
determines the lawfulness of the judgment, [then] there can be no escape from a literally 
endless relitigation of the merits because the possibility of mistake always exists.”220  In 
order to escape this endless relitigation, “the notion of legality must at some point include 
the assignment of final competences to determine legality.”221  This is a classic statement 
of the principle of finality – the notion that a functioning legal system must, at some point, 
come to a final and irreversible decision regarding the dispute in front of it.  “Somehow, 
somewhere,” wrote Prof. Bator, “we must accept the fact that human institutions are short 
of infallible; there is reason for a policy that leaves well enough alone and which 
channels our limited resources of concern toward more productive ends.”222   
Applying this view of finality, Prof. Bator argued that “if one set of institutions 
has been granted the task of finding the facts and applying the law and does so in a 
manner rationally adapted to the task, in the absence of institutional or functional reasons 
to the contrary we should accept a presumption against mere repetition of the process on 
the alleged ground that, after all, error could have occurred.”223  In our system, it is the 
task of the jury to find the facts and that of judges to articulate the law.  Thus, the only 
                                                                                                                                                 
habeas corpus was dramatically widening and the number of habeas filings was increasing.  In particular, 
Prof. Bator’s article criticized  the watershed case of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), which held  that 
federal courts had discretion to “redetermine the merits of federal constitutional questions [already] decided 
in state criminal proceedings.”  Brown, 344 U.S. at 507.  Prof. Bator argued that Brown had imprudently 
(and ahistorically) expanded the scope of federal habeas beyond its proper bounds. See Bator, supra note 
56, at 443 - 44. But it is Prof. Bator’s more general discussion of finality in the criminal law that is of 
interest to us here.   
219 Bator, supra note 56, at 447. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 450 - 51. 
222 Id. at 453. 
223 Id. at 454.  This is also a re-articulation of the principle of institutional settlement: “[D]ecisions which 
were the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures… ought to be accepted as binding upon the 
whole society unless and until they are duly changed.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATIONS OF LAW 4 (tent. ed. 1958) (William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)  Prof. Bator’s writings are suffused with the precepts of the 
Legal Process school.   
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legitimate issue that can be raised after a trial is “whether the conditions and tools of the 
inquiry were such as to assure a reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found 
and the law correctly applied” – in other words, “whether the processes previously 
employed for determination of questions of fact and law were fairly and rationally 
adapted to that  task.”224  On Prof. Bator’s account, then, a “failure of process” at trial is a 
legitimate reason for revisiting a conviction, and he offered up the scenarios of a bribed 
judge, a mob-dominated jury, or a defendant tortured into pleading guilty as paradigmatic 
examples of “failure of process.”225  A “‘trial’ under such circumstances,” he wrote, “is 
not a rational method of inquiry into questions of fact or law, and no reason exists to 
respect its conclusions.”226  But unless there is reason to doubt that the trial process was 
rational or fair, then there is no reason to think that any further process would yield any 
more accurate result.  We can sum up the argument thus:  Determining guilt or innocence 
is the institutional function of the trial court; so long as the trial itself is fair and free of 
procedural errors, there is no reason to “second-guess” the jury’s verdict.227  A straight-
                                                 
224 Bator, supra note 56, at 455.  This is another classic statement of Legal Process theory, which holds that 
it is the institutional competence of courts in providing procedural regularity that gives their decisions 
legitimacy.  What legitimates court decisions, on this account, is not substantive justice, but rather the 
provision of procedural regularity.  
225 Bator, supra note 56, at 455. 
226 Id.  
227 To be clear, Prof. Bator’s position does not rest on any unwarranted belief in the infallibility of juries.  
He admitted from the outset that “there is no ultimate guarantee that any tribunal arrived at the correct 
result.”  Id. at 447  But, from precisely this insight, he argued, there is no reason to believe that a second 
review of a case is any more likely to result in the “correct” decision than the first review (i.e., the trial.).  
Id. Whatever system of appeals and collateral review we choose to set up, he argued, cannot “be validated 
by the assertion that it is logically necessary if the ‘truth’ is to be established,” for again, there is no 
“ultimate guarantee” that any tribunal or any process of review will produce the truth.  Id. at 449.   
Interestingly, Prof. Bator’s argument can be read not only as a as a classic statement of the 
principle of finality, but also as a classic statement of the Due Process model of criminal procedure. 
Normally, of course, we think of commentators advocating finality as adherents of the Crime Control 
model.  But Prof. Bator saw procedural failure as a legitimate rationale – indeed, the sole legitimate 
rationale – for collateral review for any review of the trial verdict.  In that sense, he was an arch-
proceduralist. 
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forward claim of factual innocence, untethered to any claim of procedural error, simply 
has no place in this system.  
Paul Bator’s argument against a freestanding post-conviction claim of factual 
innocence is logically consistent and pragmatic in its eschewal of transcendent truth and 
in its sensitivity to the role of existing institutions.228  But too much has changed since the 
early 1960s for Prof. Bator’s brand of proceduralism to carry the day.  Perhaps in 1963, a 
hard-nosed Harvard Law School professor could bite the proverbial bullet and accept a 
miniscule number of false convictions as a tragic but inevitable product of any human 
system of criminal justice.229  But a contemporary defender of Prof. Bator’s argument 
would have a considerably more bitter bullet to bite down on.  The advent of DNA 
technology and the subsequent exoneration of more than 250 convicted persons has 
changed the terms of debate.  First, the number of people convicted for crimes they did 
not have any part in – a number which may have appeared de minimis in 1963 – now 
appears to be considerable.230  It is one thing to be serene about the possibility of a tiny 
number of innocent people serving jail-time; it is quite another to know that hundreds of 
convicted people, including many on death row,231 have been found factually innocent 
and that many experts believe that those hundreds represent the tip of the iceberg.232  
Second, the proposition that a later fact-finding inquiry is unlikely to be any more 
                                                 
228 Indeed, it is still the “winning” argument insofar as a freestanding post-conviction innocence claim is 
still not recognized as a right under federal or state law.  
229 Bator, supra note 56, at 453. (“Somehow, somewhere, we must accept the fact that human institutions 
are short of infallible.”). 
230 The precise number is, of course, unknown and perhaps unknowable.  See supra note 2. 
231 The Death Penalty Information Center counts 139 death row exonerations since 1973.  DPIC, Facts 
About the Death Penalty, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/home (“Death Penalty Fact Sheet”) 
(last visited March 6, 2010). The Innocence Project, which counts only those released pursuant to new 
DNA evidence, claims seventeen death row exonerations due to DNA evidence alone.  Innocence Project, 
Case Profiles, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited on March 6, 2010). 
232 See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 62 (2008). 
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accurate than an earlier inquiry is belied by the power of new forensic technologies.  In 
the age of DNA evidence, it is no longer credible to argue that post-conviction 
procedures are just as likely to result in error as trials conducted years before. 
In retrospect, what Prof. Bator failed to acknowledge or foresee in his argument is 
the way in which new and credible evidence can cast legitimate doubt on the verdict of 
the trial, quite apart from any procedural defect.  One need not believe all the hype 
surrounding DNA evidence to recognize that it represents a powerful and credible 
forensic tool and that it can achieve levels of accuracy in identification heretofore 
impossible.  But DNA evidence is simply the most dramatic token of a more mundane 
phenomenon – the appearance, years after the trial, of credible evidence calling into 
question the factual basis of the conviction.  New evidence can take the form of new alibi 
reports, new videotape evidence, recanted testimony, and captured computer screen-shots.  
Prof. Bator’s discussion of finality did not consider any of these possibilities.233  As the 
North Carolina commission makes “credible, verifiable” new facts a threshold criteria of 
review,234 it confronts Prof. Bator’s arguments precisely at his weakest point – indeed, 
precisely where he has refused to offer an argument.235 
We simply know that too many innocent people have been convicted, and we 
know that contemporary forensic technology can yield dispositive information unknown 
at the time of trial.  Moreover, we are no longer comfortable privileging procedural 
                                                 
233 Geoffrey Hazard makes a similar mistake when he argues against Prof. Resnick’s suggestions that more 
collateral review is necessary.  “More words and more law, but no more facts,” he writes in evident disgust.  
Hazard, supra note 209, at 651.  But the commission approach makes new facts the sine qua non of 
Commission review and takes as its very task the uncovering of more facts about the original crime.  
Indeed, under the commission approach, no more law is brought to bear on the crime at all; only new facts 
matter. 
234 § 15A-1460(1). 
235 Of course, it is not fair to criticize Prof. Bator for not directly addressing the innocence commission 
model; no such thing existed in his lifetime. 
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regularity and institutional competence over ultimate results.  The categorical denial of 
any judicial relief to the factually-innocent-but-duly-convicted is no longer a tenable 
position. 
 2.  Innocence Commissions Are Too Costly 
Most critics on the Right admit that some mechanism for post-conviction factual 
review may be necessary in extraordinary circumstances, but will argue on cost-benefit 
grounds that the creation of a free-standing innocence commission – especially one with 
such loose procedural standards – is too large an investment in additional review.  The 
cost-benefit criticism comes in many flavors, but the basic claim is that the small-but-real 
benefits provided by an innocence commission are simply outweighed by the costs of the 
commission. The focus of this type of criticism is not the principle of post-conviction 
factual review, but rather its cost.   
It is no trivial matter to set up, staff, and administer a new state commission.  
There is a selection process for commissioners, a professional staff to hire, office space to 
find, internal procedures to initiate – all the usual costs of starting a new state institution.  
Moreover, the very job of the institution (factual investigation and research) is labor- and 
resource-intensive.  So the start-up and operational costs are considerable.236  At the same 
time, the relative procedural looseness of the commission approach means that the 
commission will inevitably spend a considerable amount of time on unmeritorious cases.  
Indeed, the NCIIC has cast aside almost all of the traditional procedural bars to post-
conviction review: there are no custody requirements, no statutes of limitation, no bars to 
successive petitions, and of course, no requirements to append a constitutional claim.  
The reason to be rid of these traditional procedural “gate-keepers” is that they prevent 
                                                 
236 See supra notes164 – 165 and accompanying text. 
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meritorious cases from reaching review on the merits.  But the cost-benefit critique 
demands that each procedural liberalization cost no more in judicial resources than the 
value of the benefits it is likely to achieve in reversing wrongful convictions. 
The cost-benefit analysis has added bite if one assumes, as Prof. Erik Lillquist 
does, that there is a “generally fixed” amount of resources available for or within any 
criminal justice system.237  Thus, the creation and operation of an innocence commission 
“necessarily shifts” resources from other sources within the criminal justice system to the 
commissions themselves.238  On this view, then, innocence commissions may not only 
fail a general cost-benefit analysis, but may also siphon off resources from more 
efficacious parts of the criminal justice system.  Lillquist, for instance, argues that the 
very existence of the innocence commission renders those professionals who take part in 
its proceedings – lawyers, judges, and other law-enforcement personnel – unavailable to 
the rest of the criminal justice system.239  All that the commission does is take scarce 
resources and re-allocate them away from more efficient and more important sectors – 
e.g., first-instance trials – to an untested and inefficient sector, the new commission.240  
Under this more exacting standard, then, innocence commissions must prove not only 
that their benefits exceed their costs, but also that their net benefits are greater than the 
net benefits of other parts of the criminal justice system.  This is a criticism, then, driven 
by both judicial economy concerns and a deep sense that the right place to focus 
                                                 
237 Erik Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897, 909 (2007).. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 909 – 10. 
240 The most likely net result, Lillquist argues, is an overall “decrease in accuracy” in the justice system.  Id. 
at 909. Why?  Because, after the establishment of an innocence commission, the legal resources of the state 
– particularly its human capital – is spread even thinner over the remaining cases it confronts.  Id. 
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resources is on the initial trial, when the issues are still fresh, rather than on collateral 
procedures. 
There is, of course, some real limit to the amount of resources that any society can 
or should allocate to providing post-conviction factual review.  The question is whether 
the innocence commission approach demands too much.  Since its inception in late 2006, 
the NCIIC has cost the State of North Carolina between $200,000 and $400,000 per 
year.241  As of March 2010, it had received 635 petitions, processed over 460 cases, and 
referred three cases to the three-judge panel .242  So far, only one person, Greg Taylor, 
has achieved exoneration through the commission process.  Over a million dollars spent 
for a single exoneration – at first blush, this record might suggest that the Commission is 
not worth the cost.   
The problem with this mode of analysis is that, as rational as it purports to be, it 
cannot yield answers when both costs and benefits are denominated in anything other 
than dollars.  In the case of innocence commissions, the costs are more than just the 
dollar-value of the time and resources spent on operating the commissions; there is also 
the cost to the value of finality and the interests it serves.  And the benefits are more than 
the dollar-value of releasing an innocent person from prison;243 there are also the benefits 
to the values of accuracy, systemic legitimacy, and professionalism.  There is no way to 
tally up the value units on either side of the equation and come out with a neutral 
determination of whether innocence commissions are worth the price.   There is also no 
                                                 
241 See Roach, supra note 104, at 103. 
242 NCIIC, Case Statistics, available at http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/statistics.htm (last visited 
March 5, 2010). 
243 Incarceration of the innocent costs money, too.  Estimates of the annual cost of imprisoning one person 
in North Carolina range from $21,597 for “minimum custody” to $31,273 for “close custody.”  N.C. 
Department of Corrections, Cost of Supervision, available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/cost/ (last 
visited on March 6, 2010); see also N.C. Department of Corrections, Glossary, available at 
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/r&p/GLOSSARY.HTM (last visited on March 6, 2010). 
 51
way to compare the systemic benefits of the innocence commission to the benefits that 
could otherwise be generated by spending the same resources in another part of the 
criminal justice system.  Nobody doubts that police departments, prosecutors, public 
defenders, trial courts, and correctional facilities could all benefit from an injection of 
resources.  But it is not at all clear that the same expenditure of resources currently going 
to the NCIIC would yield greater systemic benefits if it went to those already-existing 
institutions.  The cost-benefit criticism demands a level of quantitative ability that is not 
only difficult but conceptually impossible when the units of measurement include values 
in addition to dollars and cents. 
Additionally, the monetary costs of creating an innocence commission by statute 
are almost certainly lower than the costs of a judicially created right to factual review.  A 
court-based right of review would trigger the full panoply of procedural rights for the 
petitioner.  The parties themselves would control the process, and the court system would 
have to endure whatever costs that the parties have a right to extract.  The commission 
approach actually allows the legislature to maintain greater fiscal control of the entire 
process – from specifying commission procedures, to allocating budgets, to monitoring 
the commission’s efficiency and efficacy.  And a new commission, created and funded by 
a state legislature, is likely to be more responsive to legislative concerns about cost than 
the already-existing independent judicial system.  In sum, once there is broad agreement 
that some post-conviction factual review procedure is necessary, there is good reason to 
think that the commission approach is more fiscally prudent than additional court-based 
approaches. 
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 3.  Innocence Commissions Will Not Increase Accuracy  
 The spur for creating innocence commissions rests, in part, on the knowledge that 
trial courts sometimes make mistakes and that innocent people are occasionally convicted 
for crimes they did not commit.  This knowledge suggests a couple of corollaries – first, 
that the commission itself will occasionally make mistakes and find someone innocent 
who, in fact, committed the crime and, second, that trial courts occasionally acquit guilty 
defendants. 244  Critics of the innocence commission approach have seized on both of 
these corollaries to argue that (a) the commission will lead to wrongful exonerations and 
(b) that it will do nothing to prevent wrongful acquittals at trial.  On this account, then, 
the commission fails on its own terms to increase systemic accuracy.     
 Some argue that there is a real danger that innocence commissions will lead to 
“wrongful vindications” of factually guilty persons, thus leading the criminal justice 
system even further away from accuracy.245  Indeed, on this account, innocence 
commissions may have real institutional incentives to find cases of wrongful conviction 
even where none exist.  According to standard public choice analysis, state institutions 
tend to do what is necessary to justify their continued existence.246  In the case of 
innocence commissions, the purported function they fulfill is to find innocence where the 
rest of the criminal justice system wrongfully found guilt.  On this account, the best – 
perhaps the only – evidence that the commission is doing its job is, thus, the actual 
finding of wrongful convictions.  Those attracted to working for the commission and its 
promoters will be hoping that the commission exposes the kind of spectacular cases that 
                                                 
244 The commission model does not allow the commission itself to vacate guilty verdicts, but rather to 
recommend an evidentiary hearing in front of a specially-designated court.  Only the court has the power to 
vacate the conviction. 
245 See Lillquist, supra note 237, at 908. 
246 See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 10 (1991) (explaining the essential elements of rational decisionmaking). 
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prompted the creation of the commission in the first place.247  Politicians and judicial 
officials will all be looking for evidence that the money spent on the commissions is 
worth it; state legislators in particular need good reasons to continue to fund a novel and 
independent state institution.  For the commission, there would be no better way to prove 
its worth than to expose wrongful convictions that the rest of the criminal justice system 
was unable to uncover.  Consequently, critics can argue, the commission will have an 
innate bias toward finding wrongful convictions whatever the technical burden of proof 
might be.248  The result is an intolerably high risk of wrongly vindicating the guilty. 249 
The risk that the commission would be biased in favor of leniency might be 
mitigated if its mandate also included the factual review of acquittals.  But, of course, 
innocence commissions represent a “one-way ratchet” – they allow for review of 
convictions, but not for the review of acquittals. 250  Consequently, even if the 
commission succeeds in overturning a few genuinely wrongful convictions, it cannot 
succeed in overturning wrongful acquittals.  Thus, on this argument, the commissions tilt 
the criminal justice system ever more in favor of leniency and betray their purported 
rationale of accuracy.  Everyone agrees, of course, that the current understanding of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause makes it impossible to re-prosecute a defendant for a crime of 
                                                 
247 In fact, the exoneration of Greg Taylor led a number of proponents of the Commission to proclaim its 
value.  See Blythe, supra note 170.   
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innocent.  Note that the British commission is called the Criminal Case Review Commission in part to 
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possibility of commission error resulting in the wrongful vindication of a guilty person is one that cuts 
against any liberalization of post-conviction review. 
250 See Lillquist, supra note 237, at 910. 
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which he has been acquitted.251   But, the argument goes, if the animating principle 
behind innocence commissions is to increase the accuracy of the criminal justice system 
– to insure that the labels guilty and innocent are properly assigned – then proponents of 
innocence commissions in principle ought to be in favor of similar review of acquittals, 
especially where new evidence suggests that the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime.  
The lack of any serious push to create “guilt commissions” looks to some on the Right as 
an example of liberal hypocrisy – a simple preference for clearing defendants from 
criminal liability, rather than a serious concern for accurate law enforcement. 
It is true that the creation of innocence commissions raises the chances that an 
actually guilty person may be mistakenly exonerated for his crime.  But the chances of 
such a mistake remain infinitesimally small.  Under the NCIIC system, a petitioner must 
bring forward new, credible, and verifiable evidence of innocence that is so persuasive 
that it sways the initial NCIIC staff-member who reviews the case, members of the 
NCIIC formal investigation team, five out of eight Commissioners (or eight out of eight 
Commissioners in the case of a guilty plea), and all three judges on the special judicial 
panel.  All three judges at the ultimate stage must be convinced of the petitioner’s 
innocence by a positive “clear and convincing” standard.  Even Prof. Lillquist, a 
Commission skeptic, agrees that the chances of vindicating a guilty person are “fairly 
trivial.”252    
In addition, the argument that there is an institutional incentive to find someone – 
anyone – innocent is belied by the actual institutional composition of the Commission 
and the incentives it faces.  Even if one suspects that overly idealistic staff-members 
                                                 
251 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precludes a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal). 
252 Lillquist, supra note 237, at 908. 
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might be inclined to push cases forward, the Commission itself has no inclination or 
incentive to refer unworthy cases to the three-judge panel.  First, among the 
Commissioners are a victim advocate, a sheriff, a prosecutor, and a superior court 
judge.253  They each have a stake in making sure that the interests of the crime victim, the 
prosecution, and the judicial function are respected in the process; all of these interests 
counsel against disturbing the conviction.254  Among the remaining Commissioners is 
only one person whose professional description indicates a skepticism toward guilty 
verdicts, the criminal defense attorney.  But none of the Commissioners has any incentive 
to push through an unworthy case, for the most damaging event that could befall the 
Commission or the reputation of the Commissioners is precisely the liberation of an 
actually-guilty prisoner.  
The so-called “one-way ratchet” problem is an interesting point about logical 
consistency.  But it is not an argument against innocence commissions; it is an argument 
for some type of post-acquittal review.  There is no reason, in principle, why one could 
not both support innocence commissions and support some procedure to re-prosecute 
those who were wrongly acquitted at their first trials.   In this context, it is interesting to 
note that eight years after the creation of the CCRC, the United Kingdom began to allow 
some derogation of the Double Jeopardy privilege in cases of certain serious violent 
crimes.255  Where new evidence suggests that a previously-acquitted defendant did, in 
fact, commit a particularly heinous crime, the U.K. now allows for re-trial in some 
                                                 
253 § 15A-1463(a).  
254 To be sure, I am not suggesting that any of the Commissioners act with bias – only that the Commission 
has been created in order to balance various interests, and some of those interests are better served with 
skepticism toward any change in the verdict. 
255 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §75 (U.K.) (allowing for re-trials under certain limited 
circumstances for cases of, inter alia, murder, rape, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
 56
circumstances.256  Some observers see a clear thread connecting the creation of the CCRC 
and the erosion of the Double Jeopardy privilege in the UK.257  As Prof. Lillquist 
suggests, it would not be surprising if the demand for greater accuracy in the criminal 
justice system would focus first on those suffering for crimes they did not commit and, 
next, on those enjoying freedom despite their factual guilt.258  This just goes to show that 
the value of accuracy is one that can serve (and slice against) both a Left-wing Due 
Process model and a Right-wing Crime Control model.  In the end, if one thinks that, on 
balance, innocence commissions are justice-enhancing phenomena, then one should 
support them, even if one feels that there are still other justice-enhancing phenomena that 
one seeks – e.g., some form of post-acquittal review. 
 4.  Innocence Commissions Will Lead to More Wrongful Convictions 
 One of the most subtle arguments against innocence commissions is that trial 
juries’ knowledge of such commissions will actually result in more wrongful convictions 
than would exist without the commission.259  This is because, as Prof. Lillquist writes, the 
standard of proof at criminal trials – guilt beyond a reasonable doubt – is a “floating 
standard.”260  Trial juries in a world without innocence commissions interpret guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt as a very high standard of proof; Prof. Lillquist asks us to 
imagine it as 90% certainty.261  But in a world where an innocence commission exists as 
a back-stop for the defendant, juries will begin to interpret the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard more loosely – perhaps, Prof. Lillquist suggests, as 80% certainty.262  
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261 Id. at 909. 
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Consequently, there will be a class of cases – those where the juries’ certainty is between 
80% and 90%  -- that would be acquittals in a world without innocence commissions but 
that become convictions in a world with innocence commissions.  Some number of those 
cases will be wrongful convictions, and what’s more, those wrongful convictions are 
unlikely to be overturned by the innocence commission.  Why not?  Because the 
commission’s standard of proof to overturn a guilty verdict is sufficiently high that in 
some cases where a jury found guilt to an 80%+ degree of certainty, the commission will 
not recommend reversal of the conviction.263 The net result is that there will be more 
wrongful convictions in a world with innocence commissions than without them.264 
To what extent does the possibility of commission-style factual review make 
convictions at trial more likely?  Prof. Lillquist’s hunch is that juries are more likely to 
convict if they know that there is a “back-stop” commission.  My own hunch is that the 
existence of an innocence commission is unlikely to change juror or jury psychologically 
in any measurable way.  An innocence commission is unlikely to figure into the minds of 
jurors any more than appellate courts or the Governor’s pardon power or the remote 
possibility of habeas review.  Each time post-conviction review expands, there are those 
who claim that the trial process will suffer as a result. Geoffrey Hazard once asked 
rhetorically, “[W]hat if everything a trial judge does is in principle merely provisional, 
subject to approval by higher authority, both as to substance and as to technical 
                                                 
263 Id. Nor, presumably, would a special court vote unanimously to vacate all of the wrongful convictions 
that slip through on the now-lower beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
264 Id. This argument against innocence commissions does not, at first glance, appear to be an argument 
from the Right, but its motivating concern is for the integrity of the trial of first instance.  In this sense, it 
sits comfortably with the constellation of interests served by finality – particularly, the concern that 
additional procedures inevitably reduce the prestige, power, and accuracy of the criminal trial itself.   
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regularity?”265  Though the question was rhetorical, there is in fact very little evidence, 
statistical or anecdotal, that the expansions of appellate and post-conviction review of the 
past seventy years have led to any diminution in the quality of trials or of judging or of 
jury fact-finding.  Prof. Lillquist relies on a few empirical studies for the proposition that 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is a floating standard,266 but there is no data to 
support the proposition that the availability of commission-like review will actually warp 
that standard.  Still, Prof. Lillquist’s hypothesis suggests that the rate of conviction and, 
to the extent possible, the behavior of juries ought to be monitored in North Carolina to 
help determine whether the Commission has, in fact, resulted in perceptible changes in 
jury behavior.  No such studies exist at present.  Prof. Lillquist’s argument is a potent 
reminder that criminal justice reformers ought to think many steps ahead to insure that 
accuracy-enhancing procedures at the post-conviction review stage do not backfire and 
increase miscarriages of justice at earlier stages of the criminal process (e.g., at trial).  
But the argument that innocence commissions will so warp jury behavior as to actually 
increase wrongful convictions is, at this point, completely speculative.  
B.  Criticism from the Left: The Value of Innocence Review  
 
The interest of a convicted person in access to factual review is clear:  Depending 
on the sanction he is enduring, his very life, liberty, property, reputation, and/or social 
status is at stake.  Criminal conviction results in both direct criminal sanctions – the death 
penalty, incarceration, fines, and/or restitution – plus a host of collateral consequences – 
                                                 
265 Hazard, supra note 209, at 650.  Hazard suggests that, in such a world of over-bearing review, state 
court trial judges will no longer act “like judges”  because “they are not treated like judges.” Id. 
266 See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 85, 118-30 (2002) (cited in Lillquist, supra note 237, at 908 n. 63). 
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from official civil disabilities to social stigma and economic dislocation. 267  It is hard to 
overstate the negative effects of criminal conviction on the life chances of a person, and 
as a consequence, the potential benefits of judicial “vindication” – that is, a quashing of  
conviction – are also extraordinary.  The individualized interest of the petitioner thus 
always weighs very high in post-conviction review cases. 
But apart from the petitioner’s own interests, there are vital social values at stake 
in actual innocence review, most prominently the systemic commitment to accuracy.  By 
accuracy, I mean the basic principle that only individuals guilty of committing a criminal 
act should be convicted of a crime.  Here, the distinction between conventional habeas 
review and the kind of factual review conducted by the commission approach is 
important.  The habeas regime we constructed in the second half of the twentieth century 
serves the important social interest of insuring systemic compliance to constitutional due 
process.  But the social interest served by traditional habeas review strikes many people 
as abstract and technical – it is, in the end, about procedural regularity.  Innocence review, 
on the other hand, is about the very substance of criminal justice:  Did the petitioner 
commit the crime or not?  Innocence review signals a systemic commitment to the 
accurate sorting of the guilty from the innocent, which is the system’s very raison d’être.  
This interest – society’s interest in a criminal justice system that accurately sorts the 
guilty from the not-guilty – is hard to overstate.  And it is visceral:  Everybody 
understands that the conviction of an innocent person is a profound injustice, while many 
                                                 
267 If he is on death row, his life is at stake, and if he is in prison or jail, his liberty is at stake.  See Sanders 
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The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to Clear One’s Name, 2009 
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people find it hard to see a conviction based on a procedural violation in the same 
category.  In the case of habeas, citizens are asked to accept a diminution in finality for 
an abstract commitment to the procedural norms of the system.  In the case of innocence 
review, citizens are asked to accept a diminution in finality for a commitment to the 
factual accuracy of convictions.   
Innocence review also serves values beyond accuracy.   Every time a new process 
of review becomes available, a diffusion of power results.268  Some level of diffusion is 
important to check concentrations that strike us as problematic throughout the judicial 
system. For instance, lay juries serve to check the power of the professional judiciary, 
appellate courts check the power of trial judges, and multi-member panels check the 
power of any single judge or justice.  The institution that the innocence commission 
checks is the jury, the primary fact-finder in our criminal trial process.  No other 
institution has taken upon itself the fact-finding mission of the jury, and judges are 
reluctant – in doctrine and in fact – to second-guess juries on pure issues of fact.269  
Commission review, which is limited to precisely the kind of fact-finding traditionally 
vested in juries, thus marginally reduces and diffuses the power of trial-court juries.270  
Of course, this diminution in the power of the jury is itself controversial, but it reflects a 
general belief that “the involvement of more people will yield better results” and will 
diffuse concentrations of power. 271  Thus, one more value promoted by innocence 
commissions is the marginal diffusion and re-allocation of institutional power currently 
held by trial-court juries.  
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Additionally, the commission system reflects a commitment to the values of 
expertise and professionalism.  Again, the contrast with lay juries is instructive.  Unlike 
lay jurors who are expected to be amateurs in the criminal justice system, staff and 
commissioners of innocence commissions are chosen precisely for their experience with 
and expertise in criminal justice issues.  The North Carolina statute, for instance, 
specifically requires that the Commission include a judge, a prosecutor, a defense 
attorney, a sheriff, and a victim right’s advocate.272  This requirement reflects a desire to 
have a diversity of views on the panel, but also a desire to have criminal justice 
professionals make the ultimate decision about whether to refer cases or not.  The statute 
also provides for a director and associated staff to “assist the Commission in developing 
rules and standards for cases accepted for review, coordinate investigation of cases 
accepted for review, maintain records for all case investigations,” and other tasks.273  In 
short, the commission system reflects the dominant values of the administrative state 
more generally: deference to subject-matter expertise, an ethic of professionalism, and 
the agency’s discretion to create internal rules, standards, and procedures consistent with 
the purposes of the authorizing legislation.274 
Finally, there is the symbolic value of a criminal justice system that is willing to 
subject its own factual conclusions to systemic review.  We might call this the norm of 
humility, or openness to self-correction, and it is the counter-part to Prof. Bator’s 
description of “repose.”  Prof. Bator correctly pointed to a general social desire for repose 
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274 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) 
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as a reason for finality, and he described repose as a pre-condition for forward-looking 
action.  Because of the unique power of the government in the area of criminal law – the 
power to imprison and to put citizens to death – there is a corresponding social desire for 
assurance that the state has exercised its power justly.  We feel the heavy weight of state 
coercion in criminal law, we feel uneasy using it, we know that the criminal justice 
system sometimes makes mistakes, and we want to be absolutely sure that the people we 
deprive of life or liberty are, in fact, guilty.  Consequently, we want to instill an ethic of 
humility and self-scrutiny into the process.  Commission review, which serves as a back-
stop to the normal workings of the criminal justice system, signals to citizens that the 
state is open to the possibility that the court system reached the wrong verdict and that it 
(the state) has established a comprehensive procedure for self-correction.  Just as Prof. 
Bator took pains to distinguish “repose” from “mere complacency,”275 I want to take 
pains to distinguish openness to self-correction from what Prof. Bator called “perpetual 
and unreasoned anxiety.”276  Humility or self-scrutiny is the frank admission that the 
normal workings of the courts sometimes result in miscarriages of justice and that we 
should be open to some degree to reviewing such claims.  This is not an “unreasoned 
anxiety,” but rather an honest recognition of the fact that many exonerations have taken 
place in the past fifteen years, combined with a determination to mitigate further 
miscarriages of justice.  To use Prof. Bator’s vocabulary, our repose has been upset by 
the revelation that hundreds of factually innocent people have been convicted and 
imprisoned by our court system; a bout of self-reflection and a serious show of self-
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correction is now itself instrumental to secure the repose that Prof. Bator calls a 
“psychological necessity.”277 
From the Left, the major deficiency of the innocence commission approach is that 
it fails to create any kind of legally enforceable right to make a stand-alone innocence 
claim in court.  To the contrary, the commission approach buries claims of actual 
innocence in the non-appealable, non-judicial process of an independent state 
bureaucracy.  From this perspective, innocence commissions are simply executive pardon 
boards in new garb – unaccountable state institutions with absolute discretion to pursue 
or ignore miscarriages of justice as they please.  Whether innocence commissions are 
able to actualize any of the values of additional review summarized above is, thus, a 
doubtful proposition.  On this view, until factual post-conviction review is available as a 
judicially-enforceable right on par with Constitutional review, the Innocence Problem 
will never be soluble. 
The Herrera case, in its refusal to find or craft a stand-alone innocence claim in 
habeas corpus, looms large in the Left-wing discourse on innocence.  One commentator 
memorably wrote that Herrera “ranks as one of those infamous Supreme Court opinions, 
like Lochner and Plessy, that is utterly repugnant to any basic sense of fairness.”278  The 
criticism of Herrera by legal academics and advocates for prisoner’s rights has been 
severe, voluminous, and continual.279 
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What most Left-wing critics of Herrera want is for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
find or create a federal freestanding post-conviction innocence claim as a matter of right, 
just as Justice Blackmun suggested in his Herrera dissent.280  The precise nature of that 
right, and its textual basis, are matters of debate among commentators on the Left.  
Brandon Garret, for instance, argues that such a right can be inferred (or created) from 
the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, and possibly even the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.281   It should be 
a “freestanding innocence claim that would grant relief to those who can show that, more 
likely than not, no reasonable jury would convict in light of the new evidence.”282  
George C. Thomas, et al., argue on both efficiency and fairness grounds that the Supreme 
Court ought to recognize an innocence claim as a Constitutional right based on the 
Mathews v. Eldridge factors.283  Even those who do not pin their hopes on a federal 
Constitutional right to innocence argue that innocence-based review should be a legal 
right.  Daniel Medwed, for instance, argues for wholesale liberalization of state-level 
procedures to allow for innocence claims based on newly discovered evidence.284   And 
Laura Constantine, et al., propose a model act for post-conviction review that “authorizes 
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state courts to consider petitions alleging actual innocence” notwithstanding “any other 
provision of law limiting consideration of new evidence.”285 
The common demand from the Left is a right to a freestanding innocence claim in 
a court of law, and the commission approach does not accomplish that.  Although the 
commission approach vests a court of law with the ultimate authority to vacate a 
conviction, it neither creates a right to innocence review, nor does it reach into the court 
system to change existing post-conviction procedures.286  Rather, the commission 
approach creates an extra-judicial body, unencumbered by court rules or by precedent, as 
a supplementary avenue of post-conviction relief.  And as presently organized, the 
decisions of this extra-judicial body, the NCIIC, are not subject to review by any court of 
law.  From the Left’s court-centric and rights-centric viewpoint, a petitioner’s inability to 
appeal the decisions of the Commission seriously undermines the Commission’s 
pretention to provide a serious new forum for post-conviction review.287  The new 
commission system, in short, does not guarantee deserving petitioners their day in court; 
it just gives them a new bureaucracy to whom they can address their grievances.  These 
criticisms from the Left go to the core of the commission approach, for the commission 
approach is precisely about taking post-conviction innocence cases away from the 
courtroom and stripping out procedural barriers of all kinds.   
One response to this type of criticism is to point out that the Left has simply failed 
to convince the Supreme Court that a free-standing innocence claim lies latent in the 
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Constitution or in common-law habeas corpus.  While the Court has not technically held 
that no such right exists,288 the prospects for a judicial “discovery” of a right to a post-
conviction innocence claim are not great.289  Moving to the legislature – both federal and 
state – the innocence movement has had some success in the past fifteen years passing 
limited DNA-related “innocence” statutes, culminating in the passage of the federal 
Innocence Protection Act of 2004.290   But, as I detailed in Section Two,  these statutes 
have fallen short of providing a straight-forward path to factual review of convictions 
because they are full of procedural and evidence-based limitations.291  In short, the 
innocence movement has run up against a wall in providing more court-based innocence 
review.  Even those who dream of a federally recognized right to innocence review thus 
have good reason to take seriously the more administrative approach that commissions 
offer.  
Moreover, a dedicated independent agency offers real advantages over court-
based procedures, advantages consistent with the values of additional review that those 
on the Left should embrace.  The next section will take up the major advantages of the 
commission approach. 
Section V:  Advantages of the Commission Approach 
 
The relative advantages of independent agencies has been a matter of debate at 
least since the Progressive era.  This is not the place to rehearse that debate, but there is 
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broad consensus that “agencies offer an appealing alternative to courts” because an 
agency can “secure for itself… whatever knowledge, analysis, or analytical capacity it 
thinks appropriate.  An ‘expert’ agency, unlike a ‘generalist’ court, is not dependent for 
what it knows about the world on the parties to particular disputes.”292  Moreover, “an 
agency has a sustained, not intermittent relationship with the parties it regulates and the 
problems it puts in its charge.”293  In the context of post-conviction factual review, the 
advantages of a dedicated agency are considerable. Not only can a commission sweep 
away procedural barriers to substantive factual review; the entire agency is geared to do – 
and do well – precisely the kind of substantive factual review that many on the Left have 
accused the courts of eschewing.  In contrast to an expert agency, the court system 
appears poorly equipped to conduct the searching factual review of jury verdicts that 
those on the Left seek.  Appellate courts, for instance, have virtually no fact-finding 
capacities of any sort, and even trial courts, sitting in collateral review, cannot match the 
initiative, expertise, and investigatory powers that a dedicated commission has.  The 
NCIIC can, for instance, conduct its own investigations, request municipal police forces 
to conduct investigations on the Commission’s behalf, subpoena relevant witnesses, and 
offer immunity in exchange for cooperation.294  All of these powers go far beyond the 
means that courts typically have at their disposal and should hearten all those committed 
to substantive review of jury verdicts.   
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A.  Dedicated Procedure for Fact-Based Claims 
The fundamental merit of the commission approach is that it provides convicted 
persons with a dedicated “address” for post-conviction innocence claims with a minimum 
of procedural roadblocks.  In Section II, I discussed the stifling procedural limits placed 
on petitioners who try to bring innocence claims to court through pre-existing post-
conviction procedures.  A person filing a claim with the NCIIC need not worry about a 
host of procedural barriers that he would face in front of a habeas court or other post-
conviction forum.  First, there is no “custody” requirement – anybody with a felony 
conviction is eligible to apply.295  Second, there is no need to claim a constitutional, legal, 
or procedural error at trial – to the contrary, the Commission has no mandate to address 
such claims.296  Third, there is no statute of limitations to worry about.297  Fourth, one 
may file a claim with the NCIIC even if one has previously petitioned a court for habeas 
relief; indeed, one may bring a claim to the NCIIC before, after, or at the same time as 
one brings appeals or other post-conviction motions in court.298  The only requirement is 
that the new evidence one brings to the NCIIC not have been presented at trial or another 
post-conviction procedure.299  Fifth, there is no categorical bar to successive application 
to the NCIIC; if the petitioner brings forth new evidence in a subsequent petition, the 
Commission has the discretion to look at the case again.300  Sixth, DNA evidence is not 
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299 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1460(1).  
300 Federal habeas has strict procedures to limit the filing of subsequent petitions.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 
2255(h). 
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required for relief; the Commission will look at any “credible, verifiable” evidence.301  
Seventh, relief is available to those who pled guilty at trial, although unanimity among 
the Commissioners is required in such cases rather than the usual five-person majority.302  
Eighth, relief is available for any felony conviction, not only for certain high-profile 
crimes.303  And, finally, the Commission itself has fact-finding and investigatory 
authority far beyond that of any private petitioner, thus allowing for the development of a 
factual record greater than what would be possible by an individual petitioner in a 
traditional post-conviction procedure.  
Critics on the Left worry that, in order to access this new avenue of relief, 
petitioners must give up too many of the procedural rights they take for granted in courts 
– including, among others, the right against self-incrimination, attorney-client privilege, 
and spousal privilege.304  No other petitioners for post-conviction review are required to 
relinquish these rights – in particular, the Constitutional right against self-incrimination.  
From a doctrinaire Due Process model framework, petitioners claiming innocence should 
not be required to trade in their Constitutional and common-law rights for the “privilege” 
of proving their innocence. 
But in the context of an expert agency devoted to ferreting out wrongful 
convictions, the requirement that petitioners cooperate with Commission investigations 
and give up some procedural rights is reasonable.  By definition, a petitioner to the 
Commission has already been convicted of the crime that is the subject of inquiry, and 
                                                 
301 Most state statutes passed in the past fifteen years to allow for some factual review are restricted to 
DNA evidence.  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
302 Many of  the new state innocence statutes explicitly deny relief to those who pled guilty.  See supra note 
76 - 77 and accompanying text. 
303 Many of the new state innocence statutes limit relief only to those who committed specific serious 
crimes.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
304 Chris Mumma, Guidelines for Counsel Appointed by Indigent Defense Services (Aug. 14, 2007) 
(pamphlet on file with author).   
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the petitioner’s waiver of his right against self-incrimination “does not apply to matters 
unrelated to a convicted person’s claim of innocence.”305  Thus, the primary interest 
served by the right against self-incrimination – petitioner’s interest in avoiding 
prosecution or conviction – is not operative in the post-conviction context.  And because 
the waiver does not apply to unrelated matters, the petitioner need not expose himself to 
liability for matters unrelated to the crime for which he seeks review.  Mandatory 
petitioner cooperation with the Commission is similarly defensible in light of the 
petitioner’s role in triggering Commission review in the first place.306  
In sum, the innocence commission cuts through many, if not all, of the procedural 
barriers that keep courts from looking at actual innocence claims on the merits.  Because  
such procedural barriers have kept meritorious claims of innocence out of court, the 
Commission approach represents a major improvement in the availability of factual 
review.  
B.  Independent Investigatory Power 
The NCIIC has the virtues of an independent commission with broad 
investigatory powers.  The Commission is independent in at least two respects – (1) as an 
“independent commission” existing between branches of government and (2) as a neutral 
entity unaffiliated with either the State prosecutor or the defendant.   It is not a judicial 
body, though the Administrative Office of the Courts provides administrative support to 
the Commission.307  It is not part of the executive branch, though it is a standing 
commission.  And it is not part of the legislative branch, though the legislature created 
and funds it.  Its activities are not subject to direct review by the Governor, the Chief 
                                                 
305 § 15A-1467(b). 
306 § 15A-1467(b), (g). 
307 § 15A-1462(b).  
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Justice, or the General Assembly.  Consequently, it is removed from both the political 
considerations that plague the executive clemency process and the hierarchical 
relationships that bind district and appellate courts.  At the same time, the Commission is 
independent of both the State prosecutors and defense bar, nor is it an adversarial forum.  
Commission staff, not advocates of the State or the applicant, direct the investigations at 
the Commission and develop the factual record, and the Commission has the power to 
demand cooperation out of both the State and the petitioner.308  Indeed, the petitioner 
must waive all of his rights and privileges with respect to the investigation of the 
underlying crime before the Commission will launch a formal inquiry.309   
Moreover, the investigatory powers of the Commission are robust.  It has the 
power to subpoena documents and witnesses, it can compel testimony in exchange for 
limited immunity, and it can use any means of discovery provided for in the state civil or 
criminal rules of procedure.310  In essence, it has the combined investigatory powers of 
the police, a grand jury, a district attorney, defense counsel, and a court of law.  The 
existence of investigatory power does not, of course, mean that all investigations will be 
perfectly thorough or that they will all reach the truth of the matter.  But it does mean that 
the Commission has the tools to function as a fact-finder with as few procedural barriers 
as possible.  In its power and neutrality, the Commission functions more like a juge 
d’instruction in the civil law system than a judge or jury in the traditional common-law 
scheme.311  The Commission’s independent investigatory authority coheres with the 
                                                 
308 § 15A-1467(b), (g). 
309 § 15A-1467(b).   
310 § 15A-1467(a)(1). 
311 The office of juge d’instruction is often translated as “investigating magistrate.”  A juge d’instruction is 
a judicial-branch figure responsible for directing investigation at trials in the French criminal justice 
system; the position is noteworthy for its independence from both the prosecutors and the defendant.  See 
A.E. Anton, L'Instruction Criminelle, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 441 (1960). 
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common-sense intuition that a claim of factual innocence should be reviewed – at least 
initially – by an entity that has robust fact-finding capabilities and the potential to build 
up investigatory expertise.   
C. Ancillary Benefits of the Commission  
Because of its independence, its robust investigatory powers, and its authority to 
refer cases to the judiciary, the Commission has the potential to ameliorate the criminal 
justice system beyond the particular cases that come before it.  First, its mere existence 
serves to remind law enforcement authorities that “winning” in front of a jury is not their 
goal; rather, bringing to justice actual criminal perpetrators is the goal.  It is a truism that 
punishing an innocent person is a double-injustice, but police departments and 
prosecutors understandably aim to secure convictions.  To the extent that the existence of 
the Commission cuts down on spurious but easily winnable cases, that is a positive result. 
Second, by bringing to light miscarriages of justice, the Commission may 
highlight specific areas in which the justice system can improve.  The causes of any 
particular wrongful conviction are heterogeneous and often over-determined, but as many 
other studies have noted, many wrongful convictions can be traced back to a finite 
number of places in the law enforcement and trial process – e.g., eye-witness 
identification, indigent defense, or forensic science.312  After a number of years in 
operation, simply by doing its routine investigations. it is likely that the Commission will 
have helped identify where problems lie in the current system.  Of course, generalized 
research into the problem of wrongful conviction is not the primary focus of the NCIIC.  
But it will inevitably produce a substantial and detailed record pertaining to wrongful 
                                                 
312 The Innocence Project, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited on March 6, 2010). 
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convictions through (a) its findings of fact and supporting documentation in cases that it 
refers to the three-judge panel313 and (b) its required annual reports to the legislature.314  
The NCIIC’s annual report “may contain recommendations of any needed legislative 
changes related to the activities of the Commission” and “recommendations concerning 
the district attorneys or the State Bureau of Investigation.”315  The Commission may use 
its annual reports to offer broad recommendations to the legislature and to state law 
enforcement agencies regarding almost all aspects of the criminal justice system.316  At a 
minimum, the Commission could use its reports to aggregate and analyze information 
that would be of great help to reformers outside of the Commission.  Through these 
reports, the Commission cannot help but serve as an agent of transparency for the entire 
state criminal justice system.   
Finally, the Commission provides an important legitimating function to the 
overall criminal justice system.  Every system of criminal justice – every human 
institution – is bound to make mistakes.  The Commission is not going to catch every 
mistake, and it too may make mistakes.  But the question is whether the system is diligent, 
honest and self-confident enough to provide sufficient means to correct mistakes.  By 
providing such means, the Commission signals to the citizens of the state that the 
criminal justice system is not going to ignore, or sweep under the carpet, blatant 
                                                 
313 § 15A-1468(c), (e).   
314 The annual report is addressed to the Joint Legislative Corrections, Crime Control, and Juvenile Justice 
Oversight Committee and the State Judicial Council.  See NCIIC, 2009 Annual Report, available at 
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/Report2009.htm (last visited March 6, 2010) (2009 Annual 
Report).  The State Judicial Council is an advisory and oversight body for the Judicial Branch of 
Government, chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and consisting of representatives from 
every component of the court system, the bar, and the public. Its various specific and general duties 
encompass studying and monitoring the operations of the court system, and identifying areas for 
improvement.  See The N.C. Court System, The State Judicial Council, available at 
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/JudicialCouncil/Default.asp (last visited March 6, 2010). 
315 § 15A-1475.  
316 Most likely due to staffing limitations and political sensitivity, the first two annual reports were fairly 
modest and did not offer any suggestions for systemic reform.  See, supra note 314,  2009 Annual Report. 
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miscarriages of justice.  Rather, the state seeks to uncover such miscarriages and right the 
wrong.  After the cases of Ronald Cotton and Daryl Hunt, among others, revealed the 
scope of the Innocence Problem in North Carolina, the state’s demonstrated commitment 
to freeing the innocent is particularly timely and may go a long way to boosting the 
overall legitimacy of the criminal justice system.317   
 
Section VI:  Proposed Reforms 
 
Up to this point, I have defended the Commission approach against systemic 
criticism from both the Left and Right, and I have offered an account stressing its 
advantages.  In this section, I want to discuss a few smaller-scale critiques of the NCIIC 
and suggest relevant reforms.   
Every agency has to balance the goals of efficiently carrying out its tasks with 
providing individualized procedural fairness.318  The liberal critique of the NCIIC 
essentially holds that the Commission, as presently constituted, gives short shrift to 
individualized procedural fairness.  In this section, I will consider that critique 
specifically as it relates to four topics: (a) the internal procedures of the Commission 
leading to denials of petitions, (b) the possibility of judicial review of such denials, (c) 
the proper standard of review for exoneration, and (d) the Commission’s “new evidence” 
requirement.   
                                                 
317 Former Chief Justice Beverly Lake told a local newspaper that the exoneration of Greg Taylor “‘restores 
the public’s confidence in our system.’”  See Sheehan, supra note 18 (quoting former Chief Justice Lake, 
“If we find someone has been wrongly convicted, we can’t give them that time back, but we can make it 
right. That’s a victory.”). 
318 See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 293, at 38-39. 
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A. Who Guards the Guardians? Improving the Commission’s Accountability 
 
 
                                                
Like all independent agencies, the NCIIC needs a certain amount of discretion to 
complete its task efficiently, but too much discretion can result in a lack of accountability 
and a lack of procedural fairness to those affected by an agency’s actions.  As currently 
constituted, the NCIIC vests its staff with too much discretion and too little transparency.   
The executive director and staff-members of the Commission have extraordinary 
discretion to dismiss claims at a number of stages.  Before a formal Commission hearing 
ever takes place, a claim to the NCIIC must make its way through five distinct stages: 
claim initiation, claim review, further review, investigation, and formal inquiry.319  The 
executive director or a designated staff-member is empowered to reject the petition at any 
of those stages if he or she determines that the petition does not meet the eight criteria for 
Commission action.320  In practice, this means that petitions are routinely rejected by a 
single staff-member or by the executive director without any hearing in front of the 
Commission or the participation of a single Commissioner.321   
In addition, much of the Commission’s work is closed to public scrutiny.  None of 
the records or proceedings of the Commission are subject to the public record and public 
 
319 NCIIC, Case Progression Flowchart, available at http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/Flowchart.htm (last visited March 5, 2010). 
320 The eight criteria that must be met for formal inquiry are as follows: (1) Conviction must have been in 
North Carolina state court.  § 15A-1460(1); (2) Conviction must be for a felony. § 15A-1460(1); (3) 
Applicant must be a living person. § 15A-1460(1); (4) Applicant must be claiming complete factual 
innocence for any criminal responsibility for the crime.  § 15A-1460(1); (5) Credible evidence of innocence 
must exist.  § 15A-1460(1); (6)Verifiable evidence of innocence must exist.  § 15A-1460(1); (7) Claim 
must not have been previously heard at trial or in a post-conviction hearing.  § 15A-1460(1); (8) Applicant 
must sign waiver of procedural rights.. § 15A-1467. 
321 NCIIC, Rules and Procedures, art. 4(F), available at http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/rulesandprocedures.htm (last visited March 8, 2010) (“The Executive Director or his/her designee 
will have authority to make the decision whether to reject a case, call for further review, or move a case 
into formal inquiry.”).  None of this is meant to suggest that the executive director or staff-members are 
incapable of carrying out their responsibilities; my point here is only to stress the large amount of discretion 
(power) they hold. 
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meeting laws.322   Indeed, all such records and proceedings are confidential, with the sole 
exception that if the Commission votes to refer the case to a special three-judge panel, 
then all supporting records, files, and transcripts of hearings will become public.323  
Hearings before the Commission are presumptively closed to the public.324  In sum, the 
Commission has no duty to give reasons for rejecting or denying a claim, has no duty to 
release its internal deliberations on a claim, and has no duty to hold open hearings.  The 
combination of tremendous individual discretion and lack of transparency violates the 
very norms that underlie additional review. 
Moreover, the NCIIC process currently does not allow for any judicial appeal of 
Commission decisions.325  In practice, this means that a denial or rejection of a petition at 
any stage of Commission review is final and unalterable.  The unreviewability of 
Commission decisions is somewhat mitigated by the fact that petitioners are free to re-
petition the Commission, but without any appeal mechanism, the Commission faces no 
accountability from any other source.326   This lack of accountability is particularly 
problematic where the Commission issues a rejection before the stage of formal 
Commission review – which is to say, the vast majority of rejections – because rejections 
before the Commission vote stage do not come with any explanation for the reasons for 
rejection.   
                                                 
322 § 15A-1468(e). 
323 Id. 
324 § 15A-1468(a). 
325 § 15A-1470(a) (“Unless otherwise authorized by this Article, the decisions of the Commission and of 
the three-judge panel are final and are not subject to further review by appeal, certification, writ, motion, or 
otherwise.”)  This contrasts with the British CCRC approach in which adverse decisions are appealable to a 
court of law on the same basis as other administrative actions – i.e., with a “perverse or absurd” standard of 
review.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
326 The Commission exists, of course, to provide a check on the jury; the argument here is that the 
Commission itself needs a “check” in the form of judicial review.  
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This astounding amount of discretion can be mitigated in at least two ways: 
externally through judicial review and internally through bureaucratic review.  In federal 
administrative law, a party receiving an adverse agency decision usually has the right to 
judicial review, but only of a limited and deferential nature.327  If a denial from the 
Commission resulted in a de novo appellate review in a court of law, then the 
Commission would function as little more than a prelude to a court-based procedure.328  
The idea behind judicial review of agency action is to subject the agency to review strong 
enough to insure procedural regularity and legality, but deferential enough to insure that 
the court is not substituting its own substantive judgment for that of the expert agency.  
Maintaining this balance is inevitably a difficult task, but even very deferential judicial 
review serves to remind agency actors that they are accountable.  In the UK, for instance, 
decisions of the CCRC are reviewable under a highly deferential “perverse or absurd” 
standard.329  This British standard is analogous to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
that governs much judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.330  Allowing for similarly deferential judicial review of NCIIC denials would boost 
Commission legitimacy and help insure procedural regularity within the Commission at 
an acceptable level of cost in additional judicial work. 
As for more responsible internal procedures, the example of the British CCRC is 
again instructive.  Under CCRC procedures, only a Commissioner can issue a rejection – 
                                                 
327 The usual standard of review of agency action holds that agency decisions will stand unless they are 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702(2)(A) (2006). 
328 See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 293, at 747 (“If courts were to police agencies by assessing every 
administrative decision from scratch (de novo), any efficiency or other gains Congress seeks by vesting 
authority in administrators would be all but lost.”). 
329 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
330 5 U.S.C. § 702(2)(A). 
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not a staff-member.331  If a Commissioner determines that a case does not meet the “real 
possibility that the conviction . . . would not be upheld” standard, then a provisional 
rejection notice, along with a Statement of Reasons, is sent to the applicant.332  The 
applicant, in turn, has twenty business days to respond to the provisional rejection with 
any supplemental information or arguments.  If the applicant responds, then the 
Commissioner has an obligation to review the response and once again determine 
whether referral is appropriate.  If not, then a final rejection and Statement of Reasons is 
issued to the applicant.333  This procedure forces Commission staff-members to present 
their reasons for rejection to at least one accountable Commissioner, and it forces 
Commissioners to issue reasons for rejection to the petitioner.  In the provisional nature 
of the initial rejection, this procedure also mimics agency notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, allowing the most affected party one more chance to make his or her case.  
The NCIIC would do well to adopt the CCRC approach to denials of petitions.  Doing so 
would increase the transparency and accountability of Commission decisions, it would 
grant petitioners more “voice” in the process, and it would incentivize greater reasoned 
decision-making inside the Commission.  It is true that the institution of such procedures 
will also increase costs and “red tape.”  But the present balance of values is skewed too 
far on the side of agency discretion, and a modest increase in procedural fairness would 
tilt the balance back in the right direction. 
 
                                                 
331 CCRC, How We Review Your Case, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/canwe/canwe_33.htm (last 
visited on March 6, 2010). 
332 Id. 
333 Id. 
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B.  The New Evidence Requirement and the Standard of Review 
 
Some may argue that the commission approach, as it manifests itself in the NCIIC, 
sets too high a burden on the petitioner to prove his or her innocence.  The burden is two-
fold:  First, a petitioner must present evidence that is new, credible, and verifiable in 
order for his or her claim to survive the Commission process.334  Second, the standard of 
review in front of the three-judge panel is “whether the convicted person has proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that [he] is innocent of the charges.”335  
Prof. Michael Risinger has set out the most compelling case for a lower standard 
of review in appellate or post-conviction proceedings.  Specifically, Prof. Risinger argues 
for an “unsafe verdict” standard, modeled on the British standard of the same name, for 
the review of cases that turn on factual innocence.336  The basic idea is that the post-
conviction review of binary factual determinations ought to be particularly searching 
because juries are not very well-suited to making such determinations.337  Under the 
unsafe verdict standard, a reviewing court will vacate a conviction if the court “entertains 
a ‘lurking doubt’ that the defendant was rightly convicted, or where the court is not ‘sure’ 
that the defendant was ‘rightly convicted.’”338 The idea of this standard is to prod 
                                                 
334 § 15A-1460(1). When the Commission votes to refer a case to the three-judge panel, the standard is 
whether “there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit judicial review.” § 15A-1469(a). 
335 § 15A-1469(h). 
336 D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standard for the Trial and Review of 
Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281 (2004).  While Risinger’s proposal of the unsafe verdict 
standard was not made specifically in the context of innocence commissions, it is emblematic of a Left-
wing approach to post-conviction factual review.   
337 Id. at 1307 (arguing that juries are not well-suited to decisionmaking “when the actual triable issue in a 
criminal case is the simple binary issue of perpetration, or a similar pure-fact binary issue”).  According to 
Risinger, juries are well-suited to the task of tackling “normatively charged polyvalent issues,” but not to 
making binary factual determinations. Id. at 1311. 
338  Griffin, supra note 114, 115 (2009).  Others have described the unsafe verdict standard as one 
compelling relief if the court determines that it is “no longer reasonably likely that the same verdict would 
have resulted.” Id. at 116.   
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appellate courts – or courts sitting in collateral review – to meaningfully engage with the 
evidence and factual findings undergirding jury verdicts. 
The unsafe verdict standard differs from the standards at use is the NCIIC process 
in two ways.  First, under an unsafe verdict standard, the petitioner need not present new 
evidence in order to obtain a hearing or relief.  Whether new evidence is proffered or not, 
the reviewing court needs to be convinced that the underlying conviction was rightly and 
securely entered.  Second, while the unsafe verdict, like all standards, may not pick out a 
precise quantum of burden of proof, it undoubtedly falls well below the “clear and 
convincing” standard of proof required of petitioners in the NCIIC process.  On this 
account, the burden should not be entirely on the petitioner to show that he or she is 
clearly and convincingly innocent; rather, once the Commission has determined that there 
is real reason to review the underlying verdict, then the reviewing court must satisfy itself 
that the factual basis for conviction is “safe” before affirming conviction. 
These critiques of the NCIIC approach have real bite,339 but pragmatic 
considerations caution against adopting them any time soon.  The Innocence Commission 
is a novel institution, operating within a limited budget, and taking on a relatively 
unpopular task.  For it to succeed, it must be extremely cautious in its early phases.  The 
new evidence requirement is a mechanism allowing the Commission to limit its “docket,” 
and thus focus its limited resources on the most promising and most sympathetic sub-set 
of innocence claims.   Moreover, this sub-set of cases responds directly to the sensational 
stores of post-conviction vindication that sparked the creation of the Commission in the 
                                                 
339 If we take seriously the proposition that juries can make mistakes on the facts in front of them, then 
there is no reason in principle to demand new evidence from a petitioner claiming factual innocence.  
Perhaps the burden of proof on such a petitioner ought to be higher than on a petitioner who brings new and 
credible evidence, something analogous to the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” in reverse.  See, e.g., 
Risinger, supra note 336, at 1310 – 13. 
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first place: namely, cases in which new evidence proved the convicted person’s 
innocence.  Perhaps a more secure Commission, one that has become an uncontroversial 
part of the criminal justice landscape in North Carolina, may re-consider the “new 
evidence” requirement at some point.  But in the here and now, the most prudent course 
is to continue to require new evidence before acting on innocence claims. 
The “clear and convincing” standard is also a pragmatic way to limit relief to 
those whom the panel deems positively innocent.  An unsafe verdict standard raises the 
possibility that the court could vacate a conviction not because it finds the petitioner 
innocent, but rather because it is not convinced of the petitioner’s guilt.  The gray area 
between actual innocence and doubtful guilt is a fascinating place for theoretical inquiry, 
but it is not the area that the commission system was created to explore.  The commission 
system’s mandate is to vindicate only those who can show actual innocence.  For that 
mandate, a “clear and convincing” proof of innocence is the right standard.  Moreover, 
the high standard serves an important signaling function to the wider public; it assures 
state citizens that only the most worthy petitioners, those with clear and positive evidence 
of innocence, will be exonerated.  For these pragmatic reasons, the new evidence 
requirement and the high standard of proof strike me as prudent ways for the Commission 
to achieve greater legitimacy within the state criminal justice system and to build a record 
as a cautious and prudent institution.   
 
Section VII: Conclusion 
 
Innocence commissions will not make our country’s Innocence Problem go away.  
Even if every state and the federal government adopted the Commission model, innocent 
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people will continue to be convicted and punished for crimes they did not commit, and 
innocence commissions will fail to right many miscarriages of justice.  The problems of 
wrongful conviction stem from a long list of issues in law-enforcement and trial 
procedures – from police line-up practices to eyewitness evidence rules to our system of 
indigent defense, to name only a few.  And the problems besetting out existing court-
based regime of post-conviction review will remain largely untouched by the 
establishment of innocence commissions.  The commission approach represents not  a 
“fix” for habeas corpus and other post-conviction procedures, but rather an attempt to 
escape the whole tangled mess. 
The commission approach aims to reform only one small piece of the puzzle – 
namely, how to address freestanding post-conviction claims of actual innocence.  And 
with respect to that narrow problem, the commission approach offers a significant 
improvement over the status quo.  By providing a dedicated address for petitioners to 
make claims of factual innocence and a staff with the power and expertise to assess those 
claims, the commission approach cuts through the systemic difficulties of reviewing final 
convictions.  
Some of the reluctance to create new post-conviction procedures stems from a 
legitimate fear that new procedures will exact too much of a price in real dollars and in 
the constellation of values we call finality.  The creation of innocence commissions 
undoubtedly comes at a price in both resources and in systemic finality.  But what we 
have learned over the past fifteen years is that the existing system over-values finality at 
the price of too many miscarriages of justice.  The commission approach represents a 
modest but necessary correction to that imbalance.  
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As a new institution and an independent agency, the NCIIC must itself strike a 
delicate balance between efficacy and fairness.  I have suggested that the Commission 
ought to bolster procedural fairness in two ways: (1) by requiring a Commissioner – 
rather than a staff-member – to approve all denials and (2) by providing for some type of 
limited and deferential judicial review of denials.  I further suggested that, in time, the 
Commission ought to consider dropping the new evidence requirement, for some jury 
decisions are simply wrong on the evidence before them.  
Overall, in just over three years of operation, the NCIIC is proving itself to be an 
extremely promising new mechanism for providing post-conviction factual review.  The 
exoneration of Greg Taylor in February 2010 was a giant step in the maturation of the 
Commission.  One hopes that this experiment will continue to attract serious scholarly 
attention and criticism in the months and years ahead and that it will, in its own modest 
way, contribute to an improvement in justice in America. 
